nanog mailing list archives
Re: BGP to doom us all
From: Daniel Karrenberg <daniel.karrenberg () ripe net>
Date: Tue, 4 Mar 2003 16:08:43 +0100
On 28.02 18:13, Barry Raveendran Greene wrote:
Now - show me an operational environment on the Internet were this authorization chain is _working_ today. RIRs and RADB do not count. As you mention before, those databases and keeping them up to date are a "pulling teeth" exercise. ... My opinion is that lazy operational practices are the single biggest threat to the Internet. What's the point of building security and robustness into a system when people choose not to turn it on?
RIRs do count and the infrastructure to set up the chain is there. Address assignment and allocation is a quite formal and well recorded process these days. The address *allocation&assignment* databases are in good shape for about the last 8 years. The fact that they are not in good shape for assignments from "the good old days" is true. But this is being actively worked on and one should not blow it up out of proportion. Deploying technologies like SBGP would of course provide additional incentives to record allocations and assignments and the resulting signing of certs even better. Daniel
Current thread:
- Re: Tools, (continued)
- Re: BGP to doom us all Rafi Sadowsky (Mar 04)
- Re: BGP to doom us all bmanning (Mar 04)
- Re: BGP to doom us all Iljitsch van Beijnum (Mar 04)