nanog mailing list archives
Re: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model
From: Harald Koch <chk () pobox com>
Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2011 10:09:13 -0400
On 3/23/2011 11:05 PM, Martin Millnert wrote:
To my surprise, I did not see a mention in this community of the latest proof of the complete failure of the SSL CA model to actually do what it is supposed to: provide security, rather than a false sense of security.
This story strikes me as a success - the certs were revoked immediately, and it took a surprisingly short amount of time for security fixes to appear all over the place.
> In some places, failure of internet security means people dieThose people know that using highly visible services like gmail and skype is asking to be exposed...
-- Harald
Current thread:
- Re: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model, (continued)
- Re: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model Dorn Hetzel (Mar 25)
- RE: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model Akyol, Bora A (Mar 25)
- Re: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model Valdis . Kletnieks (Mar 25)
- Re: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model Ariel Biener (Mar 26)
- Re: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model Martin Millnert (Mar 25)
- Re: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model Steven Bellovin (Mar 25)
- Re: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model Joe Sniderman (Mar 25)
- Re: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model Franck Martin (Mar 25)
- Re: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model Steven Bellovin (Mar 26)
- Re: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model Christopher Morrow (Mar 24)
- Re: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model Leif Nixon (Mar 24)
- Re: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model Tony Finch (Mar 24)
- Re: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model Richard Barnes (Mar 24)
- Re: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model Dan White (Mar 24)
- Re: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model Brian Keefer (Mar 24)
- Re: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model Danny O'Brien (Mar 24)