nanog mailing list archives

Re: First real-world SCADA attack in US


From: Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists () gmail com>
Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2011 17:02:34 -0500

On Mon, Nov 21, 2011 at 4:51 PM, Jason Gurtz <jasongurtz () npumail com> wrote:
Having worked on plenty of industrial and other control systems I can
safely say security on the systems is generally very poor.   The
vulnerabilities have existed for years but are just now getting
attention.

+1

Just for context, let me tell everyone about an operational characteristic
of one such system (Sold by a Fortune 10 (almost Fortune 5 ;) company for
not a small amt. of $) that might be surprising; the hostname of the
server system cannot be longer than eight characters.

The software gets so many things so very very wrong I wonder how it is
there are not more exploits!

siemens, honeywell... essentially all of the large named folks have
just horrendous security postures when it comes to any
facilities/scada-type systems. they all believe that their systems are
deployed on stand-alone networks, and that in the worst case there is
a firewall/vpn between their 'management' site and the actually
deployed system(s).

You think your SCADA network is "secure", what about your management
company's network? What about actual AAA for any of the changes made?
Can you patch the servers/software on-demand? or must you wait for the
vendor to supply you with the patch set?

folks running scada systems (this includes alarm systems for
buildings, or access systems! HVAC in larger complexes, etc) really,
really ought to start with RFC requirements that include strong
security measures, before outfitting a building you'll be in for
'years'.

-chris


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