nanog mailing list archives
Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics
From: Owen DeLong <owen () delong com>
Date: Mon, 5 Sep 2011 15:09:32 -0700
3. I think the discussion on the list so far misses what I see as the central question about the economic assumptions in that paper. The paper assumes that all destinations are equally valuable, which we know is not the case. This implicitly (and perhaps mistakenly?) shifts the balance of power to tier-1 ISPs, whereas in practice, it may be with other ASes (e.g., Google). In practice, ISPs may be willing to spend significant amounts of money to reach certain destinations or content (some destinations are more valuable than others... e.g., Google). If the most "valuable" destinations deployed S-BGP and made everyone who wanted to connect to them deploy it, that would be more likely to succeed than the approach taken in the paper, I think.Our paper does not assume all destinations are equally valuable. 1) As mentioned in our response to Randy, we weight content providers more heavily (see Section 6.8.1; we ran experiments where the content providers collectively source 10%, 20%, 33% or 50% of Internet traffic).
The point here, however, is that the value is subjective. Not all content providers are equally valuable. An access provider will get many complaints from users if they are unable to reach some content providers (e.g. google) while they will get relatively few complaints if they are unable to access others (e.g. hasthelargehadroncolliderdestroyedtheworldyet.com). Owen
Current thread:
- Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics, (continued)
- Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics Randy Bush (Sep 05)
- Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics Sharon Goldberg (Sep 05)
- Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics Leo Bicknell (Sep 05)
- Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics Owen DeLong (Sep 05)
- Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics Jennifer Rexford (Sep 05)
- Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics Owen DeLong (Sep 05)
- Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics Joe Maimon (Sep 05)
- Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics Owen DeLong (Sep 05)
- Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics Nick Feamster (Sep 05)
- Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics Sharon Goldberg (Sep 05)
- Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics Owen DeLong (Sep 05)
- Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics Dobbins, Roland (Sep 05)
- Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics Sharon Goldberg (Sep 05)
- Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics Randy Bush (Sep 05)
- Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics Alexander Harrowell (Sep 06)
- Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics Neil J. McRae (Sep 05)
- Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics Valdis . Kletnieks (Sep 05)
- Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics deleskie (Sep 05)
- Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics Randy Bush (Sep 05)
- Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics jim deleskie (Sep 05)
- Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics Randy Bush (Sep 05)
- Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics jim deleskie (Sep 05)