RE: Requirements for IPv6 Firewalls

[Brian Johnson <bjohnson () drtel com>]

Eric,

If you read what he posted and really believe that is what he is saying, you need to re-think your career decision. It 
is obvious that he is not saying that.

I hate it when threads breakdown to this type of tripe and ridiculous restatement of untruths.

- Brian

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Eric Wieling [mailto:EWieling () nyigc com]
> Sent: Tuesday, April 22, 2014 1:16 PM
> To: Dobbins, Roland; nanog () nanog org
> Subject: RE: Requirements for IPv6 Firewalls
>
> It seems to me you are saying we should get rid of firewalls and rely on
> applications network security.
>
> This is so utterly idiotic I must be misunderstanding something.    There are a
> few things we can count on in life, death, taxes, and application developers
> leaving giant security holes in their applications.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Dobbins, Roland [mailto:rdobbins () arbor net]
> Sent: Saturday, April 19, 2014 12:10 AM
> To: nanog () nanog org
> Subject: Re: Requirements for IPv6 Firewalls
>
> You can 'call' it all you like - but people who actually want to keep their
> servers up and running don't put stateful firewalls in front of them, because
> it's very easy to knock them over due to state exhaustion.  In fact, it's far
> easier to knock them over than to knock over properly-tuned naked hosts.
>
> Also, you might want to search the NANOG email archive on this topic.
> There's lots of previous discussion, which boils down to the fact that serious
> organizations running serious applications/services don't put stateful
> firewalls (or 'IPS', or NATs, et. al.) in front of their servers.
>
> The only way to secure hosts/applications/service against compromise is via
> those hosts/applications/services themselves.  Inserting stateful
> middleboxes doesn't actually accomplish anything to enhance confidentiality
> and integrity, actually increases the attack surface due to middlebox exploits
> (read the numerous security notices for various commercial and open-source
> stateful firewalls for compromise exploits), and has a negative impact on
> availability.