Technology risk without safeguards

[Suresh Kalkunte <sskalkunte () gmail com>]

Hello,

> Did you test against common equipment
> deployments or did you just measure the field
> strength?
I have not conducted any test, only going by the field strength that is
capable of causing EMI.

> In common equipment deployments, the
> electronics are wrapped in two layers of
> Faraday cage: the steel case of the equipment
> itself and the steel cabinet into which the
> equipment is installed, both well grounded.
> Penetration from even strong EM fields is limited.
I agree. Depending on the magnitude of down side, ie., to mitigate an
attack to induce electrical failure (Magnetron + horn antenna), it may be
necessary for metal clad walls and floor housing the electronic equipment.
The thickness of metal clading would need some testing with an RF emitter
discussed at https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/analysis/emp-the-
suitcase-that-can-close-down-your-site/.

> Also, if you go to the expense of boring under
> someone's data center I have to think dynamite
> will be more effective at disabling it.
If all data centers without a floor beneath are hardened to repel a
sub-surface horizontal drilling apparatus, that's great. For data centers
that do have a floor beneath, the above said metal clading is relevant.

Your comments gives me an overall impression that data center equipment are
on average adequately protected, that is good. Also, public discussion on
the risk of intentional EMI is a big positive. However, targeting a human
using powerful RF is uncharacterized (please see
https://github.com/sureshs20/De_Risk_Technology). If the RF emitters
conducive for getting re-purposed for malice were prohibitively expensive
_or_ the expertise to re-purpose RF for malice was very complex _or_ if
there were diagnostic/forensic tests to detect foul-play using powerful RF,
I would not be pursuing this initiative to safeguard
unsuspecting/defenseless targets of opportunity.

Please also note that I have been at the threshold of cancer
post-overexposure to a combination of powerful RF and X-ray (re-purposed
X-ray tube)  during this lifetime to be committed to developing
diagnostic/forensic tests and making you all aware of this in the spirit of
'fore warned is fore armed'.

Regards,
Suresh

On Wednesday, November 4, 2020, William Herrin <bill () herrin us> wrote:

> On Wed, Nov 4, 2020 at 8:49 AM Suresh Kalkunte <sskalkunte () gmail com>
> wrote:
> > I believe the below described method of causing intentional (1) damage
> to equipment in data centers and (2) physical injury to a person at the
> workplace is on-topic for the NANOG community, if not, I look forward to
> your feedback. As a software developer who has subscribed to the NANOG
> mailing list for a number of years, I post this note relying on
> intellectual honesty that I have had the opportunity to observe since
> 1996-97.
>
> Hello,
>
> Did you test against common equipment deployments or did you just
> measure the field strength?
>
> In common equipment deployments, the electronics are wrapped in two
> layers of Faraday cage: the steel case of the equipment itself and the
> steel cabinet into which the equipment is installed, both well
> grounded. Penetration from even strong EM fields is limited.
>
> Also, if you go to the expense of boring under someone's data center I
> have to think dynamite will be more effective at disabling it.
>
> Regards,
> Bill Herrin
>
>
> --
> Hire me! https://bill.herrin.us/resume/