nanog mailing list archives

Re: Incrementally deployable secure Internet routing: operator survey


From: Jeff Tantsura <jefftant.ietf () gmail com>
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2021 14:02:39 -0800

Adrian,

//Speaking as RTGWG co-chair

As commutated to SCION proponents before, a detailed presentation at IETF RTGWG would be a good starting point.
Please consider doing so at the upcoming IETF113.
The best way is to subscribe to rtgwg mailing list and respond to chairs email request for presentations, perhaps you’d 
also want to respond to comments/questions after tthe presentation, being subscribed would facilitate that.
Usually we’d prefer a draft to allow for a presentation, however, for the intro (unless you would actually go ahead and 
write an architecture draft), we’d be ok with just a presentation.

Please let me know if you have got any questions.


Cheers,
Jeff

On Dec 17, 2021, at 12:27, Matt Harris <matt () netfire net> wrote:


      
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On Fri, Dec 17, 2021 at 12:51 PM Adrian Perrig <perrig () gmail com> wrote:

Dear Nanog, 

Knowing how challenging it is to apply new technologies to current networks, in a collaboration between ETH, 
Princeton University, and University of Virginia, we constructed a system that provides security benefits for 
current Internet users while requiring minimal changes to networks. Our design can be built on top of the existing 
Internet to prevent routing attacks that can compromise availability and cause detrimental impacts on critical 
infrastructure – even given a low adoption rate. This provides benefits over other proposed approaches such as RPKI 
that only protects a route’s origin first AS, or BGPsec that requires widespread adoption and significant 
infrastructure upgrades.

Our architecture, called Secure Backbone AS (SBAS), allows clients to benefit from emerging secure routing 
deployments like SCION by tunneling into a secure infrastructure. SBAS provides substantial routing security 
improvements when retrofitted to the current Internet. It also provides benefits even to non-participating networks 
and endpoints when communicating with an SBAS-protected entity.

Our ultimate aim is to develop and deploy SBAS beyond an experimental scope. We have designed a survey to capture 
the impressions of the network operator community on the feasibility and viability of our design. The survey is 
anonymous and takes about 10 minutes to complete, including watching a brief 3-minute introductory video. 

https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSc4VCkqd7i88y0CbJ31B7tVXyxBlhEy_zsYZByx6tsKAE7ROg/viewform?usp=pp_url&entry.549791324=NANOG+mailing+list

We thank you for helping inform our further work on this project. We will be happy to share the results with the 
community.

With kind regards
  Prateek Mittal, Adrian Perrig, Yixin Sun

Adrian,
After viewing the video you included, I'm still not sure what SCION is or how it works (as best I can tell, a bunch 
of folks get together, share an AS border, and just do private AS peering with one another inside, then the shared AS 
border does the internet advertising of whatever public networks they wish?), but it sounds like your proposed 
monolithic new exercise wouldn't offer much beyond what could be done by allowing folks to get a default route VPN to 
a provider that does strict AS border RPKI ROV already. Can you describe how this would be better or stronger 
protection from any given attack than that, in a meaningful enough way as to make it worth potentially creating 
massive bureaucracies and new technical systems which seems to rely on massive networks of VPNs overlaid over the 
existing public internet? 

- mdh


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