nanog mailing list archives
Re: tiny gorillas, was opportunistic email encryption by the MTA (not MUA)
From: "John Levine" <johnl () iecc com>
Date: 15 Jan 2021 12:48:02 -0500
In article <a1f45fdbf44300cc0e6058b3e52568f3d0a61091.camel () interlinx bc ca> you write:
It's a real pity that there appears to be no real-world use/implementation of RFC8689.
I implemented RFC8689 as soon as Jim proposed it. My MTA recognizes the REQUIRETLS option and then ignores it. A lot of people who really should know better imagine that they can announce something on the Internet and other people will have to do what they say. It has never been true, and it is still not true. We've seen this before with SPF -all where people are surprised that other mail systems accept mail anyway. Opportunistic TLS is fine, as is MTA-STS which says "if it doesn't offer STARTTLS it's not me". Neither of those purport to tell other systems what to do. R's, John
Current thread:
- opportunistic email encryption by the MTA (not MUA) Randy Bush (Jan 15)
- Re: opportunistic email encryption by the MTA (not MUA) Brian J. Murrell (Jan 15)
- Re: opportunistic email encryption by the MTA (not MUA) Bryan Fields (Jan 15)
- Re: opportunistic email encryption by the MTA (not MUA) Brian J. Murrell (Jan 15)
- Re: tiny gorillas, was opportunistic email encryption by the MTA (not MUA) John Levine (Jan 15)
- Re: opportunistic email encryption by the MTA (not MUA) Rich Kulawiec (Jan 16)
- Re: opportunistic email encryption by the MTA (not MUA) Bryan Fields (Jan 15)
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- Re: opportunistic email encryption by the MTA (not MUA) Randy Bush (Jan 15)
- Re: opportunistic email encryption by the MTA (not MUA) Brian J. Murrell (Jan 15)