Re: Announcement of Experiments

[Peter Potvin via NANOG <nanog () nanog org>]

In my honest opinion, it's the fact that they're going to be using random
AS's without prior consent from those that hold said AS's, and only giving
operators a week to opt-out of something that they never opted into in the
first place.

Regards,
Peter

On Mon, May 2, 2022 at 2:10 PM Lars Prehn <lprehn () mpi-inf mpg de> wrote:

> Short Disclaimer: I frequently use the PEERING testbed myself, so I'm
> genuinely interested in where and why people draw the boundary of what's
> fine and what's not.
>
> Iirc., the route collectors see a (drastically varying) number of
> poisoned routes (assuming everything within a loop is poisoning) in the
> DFZ at any point in time, affecting a (drastically varying) number of
> ASNs, prefixes, and paths. So why would you expect this experiment to be
> noticeable at all---I mean, compared to the day-to-day, "1% of the
> Internet is beyond broken and does Yolo things" noise? Very similar
> experiments have run in the past (e.g., [1] in 2018); did you notice them?
>
> Would poisoning be tolerated if the PEERING testbed would be, e.g., some
> security-obsessed org that wants to avoid that your infrastructure
> touches any of its precious packets during the forwarding process? I
> guess what I want to figure out is: Is it the intention behind the
> poisoning experiments that bothers people or is the act of poisoning
> itself?
>
> Kind regards,
> Lars
>
> [1] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.03716.pdf
>
> On 02.05.22 16:33, Raymond Dijkxhoorn via NANOG wrote:
> > Hi!
> >
> > > > If I am interpreting this correctly that you are just going to yolo a
> > > > bunch of random ASNs to poison paths with, perhaps you should consider
> > > > getting explicit permission for the ASNs you want to use instead.
> > > >
> > > > A lot of operators monitor the DFZ for prefixes with their ASN in the
> > > > path, and wouldn't appreciate random support tickets because their NOC
> > > > got some alert. :)
> >
> > > Exatly that. How about you ask people to OPT-IN instead of you wanting
> > > people to OPT-OUT of whatever experiment you feel you need to do with
> > > other people's resources.
> >
> > > When you the last time you asked the entire internet?s  permission to
> > > announce routes ?
> >
> > I dont exactly understand what you try to say its not about the route
> > its about the path.
> >
> > If the insert 'my ASN' i certainly will complain wherever i can and no
> > i will not opt out from that. I will assume they just do use my ASN.
> > Weird thought?
> >
> > Bye, Raymond

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