nanog mailing list archives

Re: Reverse Traceroute


From: Rolf Winter <rolf.winter () hs-augsburg de>
Date: Sun, 26 Feb 2023 10:38:58 +0100

Hi Hugo,

correct. It is not so bad. But you are still raising a valid point and we have been pondering over this and indeed this is one of the reasons why we have posted our work here.

I think, if you want to mount an amplification attack, you would be way better off using DNS :) A response and probe, as you said, is a little more than a request in terms of bytes on the wire. We could easily specify payload to be added to the request so that the request and the respective response and probe as equivalent in size. Would you, or anybody on this list be worried about amplification given that it only a little bit more? This would be really interesting input to us. Also, I think it would be worth while discussing over at the IETF.

Just as some additional information, we expect people to rate limit reverse traceroute, which our implementation already allows.

Best,

Rolf



Am 25.02.23 um 21:00 schrieb Hugo Slabbert:
Ah, apologies, I misunderstood:

One reverse traceroute request => one probe + one reverse traceroute response.

So it is *slightly* additive, but does not multiply out to the distance between the reverse traceroute server and the target.

On Sat, Feb 25, 2023, 11:19 Hugo Slabbert <hugo () slabnet com <mailto:hugo () slabnet com>> wrote:

    Is there a possible reflection & amplification vector here?

    * The client sends a reverse traceroute request to the server. This
    has a 12-byte ICMP header as indicated in 3.1
    * The server responds to the client with a traceroute response. This
    has a 12-byte ICMP header as indicated in 3.2, but also a traceroute
    payload of 24 bytes as indicated in 3.3

    So the total response from client to server has at least +24 bytes
    beyond the original client request? And a spoofed source address on
    a reverse traceroute request would then direct the reverse
    traceroute response to the spoofed victim?

    +24 bytes is not a huge amount in terms of amplification, but if
    this is accurate, is that perhaps worth calling out in the security
    considerations?

    Actually: Would there not also be a slight additional bit of traffic
    to the spoofed address, in that the actual traceroute probe itself,
    that is sent from the reverse traceroute server, is also directed
    towards the spoofed source IP address? The last probe in the series,
    that has a TTL equal to the distance between the reverse traceroute
    server and the probe target, would reach the target, but additional
    probes (with TTL shorter than the distance from server to target)
    would still be flung from the server across intermediate hops.

    E.g. if I spoof a client address that is 15 hops away from the
    reverse traceroute server, then my single reverse traceroute request
    would result in:

    * 15 probes initiated from the reverse traceroute server toward the
    spoofed target (with each probe progressing one hop closer to the
    target)
    * one reverse traceroute response that is +24 bytes from my original
    request, also directed toward the spoofed target

    Am I understanding the structure correctly there?

-- Hugo Slabbert


    On Sat, Feb 25, 2023 at 5:40 AM Rolf Winter
    <rolf.winter () hs-augsburg de <mailto:rolf.winter () hs-augsburg de>> wrote:

        Hi Tore,

        thanks for the suggestion. We are already in touch with the
        NLNOG Ring
        folks. They are really helpful! But, the more the better.

        Also, for people playing with the client, it would be helpful to
        us if
        you use the --transmit command line switch. This will send
        information
        about the traceroute operation to us for further analysis.

        Additionally, the endpoint "playground.net...." is currently
        used for
        some variations of reverse traceroute, so some measurements
        might not
        work currently. You can just use any of the other endpoints.

        Best,

        Rolf

        Am 25.02.23 um 11:09 schrieb Tore Anderson:
         > * Rolf Winter
         >
         >
         >> If you would like to play with reverse traceroute, the
        easiest option
         >> is to work with the client and use one of the public server
        instances
         >>
        (https://github.com/HSAnet/reverse-traceroute/blob/main/ENDPOINTS 
<https://github.com/HSAnet/reverse-traceroute/blob/main/ENDPOINTS>).
         >> If you would be willing to host a public server instance
        yourself,
         >> please reach out to us.
         >
         > I suggest you get in touch with the fine folks at NLNOG RING
        and ask it
         > they would be interested in setting this up on the 600+ RING
        nodes all
         > over the world. See https://ring.nlnog.net/
        <https://ring.nlnog.net/>.
         >
         > Tore

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