nanog mailing list archives

Re: ROAs Expire


From: Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists () gmail com>
Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2023 11:14:22 -0500

On Tue, Jan 3, 2023 at 11:07 AM John Curran <jcurran () istaff org> wrote:

Thank you Chris!

(I scribed a quick reply where a lengthier one might have been best - I
usually have the opposite problem… ;-)


hehe :) thanks for the update on the ARIN systems!


Best wishes and Happy Holidays!


you as well!


/John

On Jan 3, 2023, at 11:01 AM, Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists () gmail com>
wrote:



On Tue, Jan 3, 2023 at 10:53 AM John Curran <jcurran () istaff org> wrote:

Mike -

A friendlier RPKI system would allow you to delegate/authorize the
automatic action of refreshing your RPKI ROA’s when they are close to
expiration.

ARIN’s current RPKI system does not provide this (we literally cannot
under the present schema as we never possess the private key that’s
necessary for our HSM to perform a ROA generation on your behalf) – but
other RIRs RPKI systems are built differently and have this functionality
today in their hosted RPKI systems.

After frequent user requests in this area – along with some requests that
are related regarding user-interface improvements – we will be moving to a
hosted RPKI environment that supports automatic ROA rollovers later this
year.  (Note - as a result of this change, folks who want strong assurance
of non-repudiation of ROA generation should consider delegated or hybrid
RPKI setups.)



To clarify, your last paragraph:
  today ARIN has an HSM, for parts of the work, but requires that the user
(me, mike, jared) hold our
  private key(s) used to sign objects locally. this means that ARIN never
sees the private key material.
  a private key would be required to be visible/accessible to ARIN's
system(s) in order to auto-update
  a ROA(s) in such a new system.

  Further, the future system (that will enable auto-update of ROA) will
need access to the private key
  material. This means that POSSIBLY ARIN or a bad-actor may be able to
use that private key material
  for bad deeds. (note I'm not saying ARIN is a bad actor, nor that they
want to do bad things)
  So folks that need/want to be more assured that their private key
material is 'safe' will need to move
  off the ARIN Hosted deployment prior to the new system coming alive.

Maybe that's all super clear to everyone else, but :) sometimes more words
are more better/clear.


Thanks (and Happy Holidays!)
/John

John Curran
President and CEO
American Registry for Internet Numbers

On Jan 3, 2023, at 10:42 AM, Mike Hammett <nanog () ics-il net> wrote:

Nothing went south for me, just got an email from ARIN reminding me that
they were about to expire.

The reasons you stated all make sense. We'll just have to make sure it's
easy enough for the less skilled or more busy operators to comply with
current best practices, lest they not do it at all to avoid the hassle.



-----
Mike Hammett
Intelligent Computing Solutions <http://www.ics-il.com/>
<https://www.facebook.com/ICSIL>
<https://plus.google.com/+IntelligentComputingSolutionsDeKalb>
<https://www.linkedin.com/company/intelligent-computing-solutions>
<https://twitter.com/ICSIL>
Midwest Internet Exchange <http://www.midwest-ix.com/>
<https://www.facebook.com/mdwestix>
<https://www.linkedin.com/company/midwest-internet-exchange>
<https://twitter.com/mdwestix>
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<https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCXSdfxQv7SpoRQYNyLwntZg>
------------------------------
*From: *"Jared Mauch" <jared () puck nether net>
*To: *"Mike Hammett" <nanog () ics-il net>
*Cc: *"NANOG" <nanog () nanog org>
*Sent: *Tuesday, January 3, 2023 9:39:10 AM
*Subject: *Re: ROAs Expire

On Tue, Jan 03, 2023 at 08:56:28AM -0600, Mike Hammett wrote:
ROAs expire. Creating new ones doesn't seem to be terribly difficult,
but why do they expire in the first place?

        There's several reasons I can see why one would want this:

1) to ensure that proper care is maintained over the IP space, domains,
certificiates (ROA is a certificiate), etc expire and require renewal.

2) If there's a new cipher algo flaw or similar, it may become necessary
to rotate things.

3) to help avoid some of the problems that exist with unmaintained IRR
objects.

        There's more I'm sure, but this is one of the reasons that I
personally have been hesitatant to roll out some tools, eg: DNSSEC
(which suffers from a variety of ciphers and for some cases lack of
ability to publish to parents - i think this was largely resolved).

        With this increased security also comes to increased fragility,
which I suspect is what you are writing about, something likely broke
for you or someone else due to lack of checking the status of the ROA
expiration.

        This has happened in the past with domains, including big name
ones, so having something setup (eg: roa watch, similar to x509watch on
*nix systems) would be appropriate.

        I'm sure others can refer to tools or services that can do this,
but it's always a good idea to check your objects and watch when they go
away or expire.

        - Jared

--
Jared Mauch  | pgp key available via finger from jared () puck nether net
clue++;      | http://puck.nether.net/~jared/  My statements are only
mine.





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