Re: Examples of legit nmap usage?

[Andreas Kostyrka <andreas () mtg co at>]

On Sat, 18 Sep 1999, Bennett Todd wrote:

> So in-house employees don't take advantage of this setup, or else they get
> fired for cause, prosecuted, and sued. The perimeter is far better secured.
Well, talking about a Windows place: How do you prove that it was done
by some specific employee, and not somebody else:
-) Office Macros could probably download and execute some program.
-) Somebody could just have walked to the PC while the normal occupant
   is on lunch break.
-) This assumes that all employees are friendly. Not a good assumption,
   especially when you have interns and semi external personal (badly
   payed outsourced PC helpdesk workers, etc.), and you do have anything
   of value on the network.

> I don't claim this is a great model, but it's in use a lot of places. The
Well, this is kind of the ActiveX security model. "You can burgle my
house, but we know who did it." Well, in fact sometimes one doesn't know.
(Or do you log every packet on some internal segment?)
And even if you can identify the PC, it's not proof enough. Anybody
technical literate knows that most PC level OSes do not provide any
security. (Well, WinNT and Unix are exception to this rule. But WinNT
is almost impossible to setup securily, because typical Windows
application tend to expect to be able to write to the most curious
places.)

> original poster's question made me think he was talking about that sort of
> place.
Well, this kind of setup is not very funny on SOHO LAN, but it's a recipe
for desaster for anything larger. And sometimes even the PHB react, if you
scare them long enough about the security of the setup.

Andreas
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Andreas Kostyrka                     | andreas () mtg co at
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