oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: cryptographic primitive choices [was: Re: Microsoft Warns Customers Away From RC4 and SHA-1]


From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried () redhat com>
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2013 13:32:04 -0700

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On 11/15/2013 12:18 PM, Chris Palmer wrote:
On Thu, Nov 14, 2013 at 10:58 PM, Kurt Seifried
<kseifried () redhat com> wrote:

Think of all the things that currently use (often older versions
of) OpenSSL/PolarSSL/GnuTLS/etc and will never get updated...

I posit that there is a strong correlation between un-updated, 
un-updatable software that did not ship with (for example) support
for modern cipher suites and protocols, and software that should
be recalled for a variety of reasons. Random example:

https://securityledger.com/2013/08/samsung-smart-tv-like-a-web-app-riddled-with-vulnerabilities/

 Let's unpack your use of the passive voice: Who, exactly, is
choosing not to update the OpenSSL they ship? Why do we forgive
that?

We don't have a choice? We already paid our money and as far as I know
we have no recourse? We can buy "not that vendor" but all the vendors
do this, simple economics, you paid for it, why would I spend money
supporting it? Especially when that model is no longer being
manufactured. Especially when my customers appear to have no
expectation that I'll support it?

This is why I bought a "dumb" TV. And why I won't get a carrier
controlled Android phone ever (they have a less then perfect upgrade
track record). But most people are not crazy and paranoid like me.

To an extent, even security engineers are acting as enablers,
allowing obsolete software/protocols/cipher suites to live far
longer than they should have.

We can't force stuff to die, and I bet those security engineers
usually lose to managers talking about margins and such.

"LTS", "ESR", and not EOL'ing Windows XP 4+ years ago is a
significant part of the problem.

I can't speak to that, even if we support OpenSSL/whatever long term
that's only the tip of the proverbial ice berg. The supply chain for
this stuff is _deep_.

- -- 
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
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