oss-sec mailing list archives

CVE-2016-5403 Qemu: virtio: unbounded memory allocation on host via guest leading to DoS


From: P J P <ppandit () redhat com>
Date: Wed, 27 Jul 2016 20:30:01 +0530 (IST)

  Hello,

Quick emulator(Qemu) built with the virtio framework is vulnerable to an unbounded memory allocation issue. It was found that a malicious guest user could submit more requests than the virtqueue size permits, without waiting for their completion. This requires reusing vring descriptors in more than one request, which is incorrect but possible. Processing a request allocates a 'VirtQueueElement' object and therefore causes unbounded memory allocation controlled by the guest.

A privileged guest user could use this flaw to potentially crash the guest resulting in DoS. Memory exhaustion would also affect other guests and services running on the host.

This issue was discovered by Zhenhao Hong of the 360 Marvel Team.

Reference:
----------
  -> https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1358359

Given below is a proposed patch to fix this issue:

===
virtio: error out if guest exceeds virtqueue size

A broken or malicious guest can submit more requests than the virtqueue
size permits.

The guest can submit requests without bothering to wait for completion
and is therefore not bound by virtqueue size.  This requires reusing
vring descriptors in more than one request, which is incorrect but
possible.  Processing a request allocates a VirtQueueElement and
therefore causes unbounded memory allocation controlled by the guest.

Exit with an error if the guest provides more requests than the
virtqueue size permits.  This bounds memory allocation and makes the
buggy guest visible to the user.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha () redhat com>
---
 hw/virtio/virtio.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/hw/virtio/virtio.c b/hw/virtio/virtio.c
index 18153d5..398c03f 100644
--- a/hw/virtio/virtio.c
+++ b/hw/virtio/virtio.c
@@ -561,6 +561,11 @@ void *virtqueue_pop(VirtQueue *vq, size_t sz)

     max = vq->vring.num;

+    if (vq->inuse >= max) {
+        error_report("Virtqueue size exceeded");
+        exit(1);
+    }
+
     i = head = virtqueue_get_head(vq, vq->last_avail_idx++);
     if (virtio_vdev_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_RING_F_EVENT_IDX)) {
         vring_set_avail_event(vq, vq->last_avail_idx);
--
2.7.4
===


Thank you.
--
Prasad J Pandit / Red Hat Product Security Team
47AF CE69 3A90 54AA 9045 1053 DD13 3D32 FE5B 041F


Current thread: