RISKS Forum mailing list archives
Risks Digest 21.58
From: RISKS List Owner <risko () csl sri com>
Date: Thu, 9 Aug 2001 11:44:28 PDT
RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Thursday 9 August 2001 Volume 21 : Issue 58 FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS (comp.risks) ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator ***** See last item for further information, disclaimers, caveats, etc. ***** This issue is archived at <URL:http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/21.58.html> and by anonymous ftp at ftp.sri.com, cd risks . Contents: Half of Norway's banks offline for a week: erroneous keystroke (Nicolai Langfeldt) Danish police break "Safeguard" encryption program in tax case (Bo Elkjaer and Jay D. Dyson via Declan McCullagh) E-Divorce banned in Singapore (Dave Stringer-Calvert) Omron uses GPS to catch a car thief (Monty Solomon) Corrupt Michigan cops abuse police database to stalk, harass (Ed Walker via Declan McCullagh) OT: rot13, practical uses of (Joe Manfre) GA scholarship info exposed (Rachel Slatkin) DoCoMo and thttpd: i-mode DDoS attack! (Jef Poskanzer via Dug Song) Low-grade cryptography (Gene Wirchenko) Automated traffic-camera system has flaws (Dave Kinswa) Risks of the Passport Single Signon Protocol (Monty Solomon) Hotmail catches Code Red (Brian McWilliams via Dave Farber) Toll Road Transponders used to steal food at McDonald's (Arthur Kimes) More Adobe plastering (Peter Wayner) Re: WinXP blocks some versions of some programs (Michael Loftis) Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (David Chaum) REVIEW: "Computer Security Handbook", Hutt/Bosworth/Hoyt (Rob Slade) Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 07 Aug 2001 13:50:31 +0200 From: Nicolai Langfeldt <janl () linpro no> Subject: Half of Norway's banks offline for a week: erroneous keystroke http://www.digitoday.no/dtno.nsf/pub/dd20010807092448_er_28707255 (in Norwegian) This is a mix of abstracting the above article and whatever has been on the news the last few days, and one or two of my own comments: EDB Fellesdata AS runs the computer services of about half of Norway's banks. On Thursday 2 Aug 2001, they apparently installed about 280 disks in their Hitachi storage. Then, instead of initializing the new disks, they initalized _all_ their disks -- thereby wiping out the entire warehouse. EDB Fellesdata itself declines to make any statements in the case pending further contact with their customers, the banks. They are considering lawsuits, but if one of their own employees made a "user error", they may have a hard time of it. Talk about a lot of eggs in one basket, one can only imagine how many terrabytes of database this is, considering the number of disks, and how long it takes to restore from backup, and how many transactions were waiting to be processed from _other_ banks once the restore is done. Apparently the computers were running by Sunday, card services and ATMs were available on Monday, but Internet banking and automatic-phone-banking access is limited. They have announced that updated account balances will not be available until Wednesday, the 7th day after the mishap. The concerned banks' customers could pay their bills by visiting a local branch office the whole time, but apparently the transactions had not been processed because creditors have been warned that money may be late in arriving (but presumably retro-credited once the transaction is processed?). Some information gotten from the only available statement from EDB Fellesdata at http://www.edb.fellesdata.no/edb/nyheter/2001/06_08_driftstans.asp, also Norwegian. ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 9 Aug 2001 11:24:35 -0400 From: Declan McCullagh <declan () well com> Subject: Danish police break "Safeguard" encryption program in tax case [From the cryptography mailing list. --Declan; lightly-PGN-ed for RISKS]
Date: Tue, 7 Aug 2001 22:51:08 +0200 From: bo.elkjaer () eb dk Subject: Utimacos Safeguard Easy broken by Danish police in tax evasion case
The German encryption program Safeguard Easy has been broken by the Danish police. Today the police from the city Holstebro in Jutland presented evidence in court, that was provided after breaking the encryption on five out of sixteen computers that where seized april 25 this year.
All 16 computers were protected with Safeguard Easy from the german encryption provider Utimaco. It is not known whether DES, 128-bit IDEA, Blowfish or Stealth was used as algorithm on the computers. All four algorithms are built in Safeguard Easy. Details are sparse. It is not known how the encryption was broken, whether it was brute forced or flaws in the program was exploited.
The computers where seized from the humanitarian (leftwing) foundation Tvind (Humana) in connection with a case about tax evasion. Among the evidence provided from the encrypted computers were e-mails sent among the leaders of the foundation, Poul Jorgensen and Mogens Amdi Petersen describing transfers of large sums of money.
Apparently, but not confirmed, British Scotland Yard has been involved in breaking the encryption. The Danish police doesn't have the capacity to break encryption by themselves. Neither has the Danish civilian intelligence service. Routine is that cases concerning encryption is handed over to the Danish defence intelligence service DDIS. This procedure has been described earlier this year by the Danish minister of justice in connection with another case. DDIS denies involvement with the Tvind case.
Employees and leaders at Tvind has denied handing over their passwords to the computers. One even wrote a public letter mocking the chief of police in Holstebro, describing how he changed his password weekly, and stating that he'd probably even forgotten his password by now. At a time, the police considered putting employees in custody until passwords were handed over.
Bo Elkjaer, Denmark
[followed by a response]
Date: Tue, 7 Aug 2001 16:25:03 -0700 (PDT) From: "Jay D. Dyson" <jdyson () treachery net> Subject: Re: Utimacos Safeguard Easy broken by Danish police in tax evasion case
If the OS used was Windows, it's quite likely that the plaintext and/or passphrases were recovered in the Windows swap file. Barring OS considerations, it's also possible that the police put a keystroke logger on the system, just as the FBI here in the States did with an organized crime suspect.
My gut sense is that, since only five of sixteen systems were "cracked," it seems likely that it was the swap file that let the cat out of the bag. Even so, a flaw in the cryptosystem should be investigated and proven or ruled out.
Let us not also forget that people can be pressured to divulge passphrases. Rubber-hose cryptanalysis isn't just a humorous concept.
Jay D. Dyson - jdyson () treachery net
FROM POLITECH -- Declan McCullagh's politics and technology mailing list You may redistribute this message freely if you include this notice. To subscribe, visit http://www.politechbot.com/info/subscribe.html This message is archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 08 Aug 2001 20:36:36 -0700 From: Dave Stringer-Calvert <dave_sc () csl sri com> Subject: E-Divorce banned in Singapore SMS (short-text messaging) enables short messages from one cell phone to another. Muslim authorities had previously permitted men to divorce their wives by SMS. In April to June 2001, 16 divorces were so reported. However, now the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS), the Syariah Court and the Registry of Muslim Marriages are "unanimous in their view that divorce through SMS is unacceptable. ... Only a judge can confirm a divorce after deciding that there is merit in the complaint filed by the couple with the Syariah Court." [Source: Singapore bans text-message divorce, CNET News.com, 8 Aug 2001; PGNed without comment] <http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-6815505.html> ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 6 Aug 2001 01:55:35 -0400 From: Monty Solomon <monty () roscom com Subject: Omron uses GPS to catch a car thief Omron Corp. plans to deliver your stolen car, and the wretched villain inside it, right to the nearest koban (Japanese police box). "Imagine that someone steals your car, and a network of sensors in the vehicle knows the person driving is not the right person. So using its GPS, it makes the car stop outside the nearest koban and locks the driver inside. This is what I imagine, this is the next stage," said Shin'ichi Mukaigawa, an engineer at Omron's business incubation center, who has designed the basic elements for such a system. [Source: article by Paul Kallender, *EE Times*, 12 Jun 2001, http://www.eetimes.com/story/technology/OEG20010612S0059] [Quite few of you noted this item. OCSchwar () MIT edu added: How RISKy. How lovely. Hijack someone's car using this system, park it next to an empty koban, and let the Yakuza do their thing. PGN] ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 05 Aug 2001 11:59:48 -0400 From: Declan McCullagh <declan () well com> Subject: Corrupt Michigan cops abuse police database to stalk, harass [According to the third Detroit Free Press story, a cop who stalked a woman using his access to police databases was "suspended for a day without pay." That'll teach 'em! --Declan] [FROM POLITECH]
Date: Sat, 04 Aug 2001 02:08:36 From: "Ed Walker" <ed_walker () hotmail com> Subject: Michigan cops abusing database
www.governing.com/news had a link to a freep article that may be of interest to politechnicals. The first two links are the story, and the third is an account of a truly creepy cop stalking someone he met while on duty.
Michigan Newspaper: Police Abuse Database Police throughout Michigan, entrusted with the personal and confidential information in a state law enforcement database, have used it to stalk women, threaten motorists and settle scores. Over the past five years, more than 90 Michigan police officers, dispatchers, federal agents and security guards have abused the Law Enforcement Information Network, according to a Detroit Free Press examination of LEIN records and police reports. More: Detroit Free Press http://www.freep.com/news/mich/lein31_20010731.htm http://www.freep.com/news/mich/lein1_20010801.htm http://www.freep.com/news/mich/amber31_20010731.htm
Ed Walker
------------------------------ Date: 7 Aug 2001 20:23:21 GMT From: manfre () flash net (Joe Manfre) Newsgroups: alt.usage.english Subject: OT: rot13, practical uses of [Contributed by Mark Brader. PGN] Recently there has been some discussion on AUE of the many fascinating ways in which the venerable letter-substitution scheme called "rot13" can be used. Well, this article may be of some interest: http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/comment/0,5859,2800985,00.html It deals with a certain Russian cryptanalyst who has been jailed for cracking and exposing the encryption schemes that some electronic book publishers use to protect their copyrighted properties. Turns out that one publisher of industrial reports was using rot13 to protect its valuable (to the tune of $3,000 a pop) works. Joe Manfre, Hyattsville, Maryland. ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 8 Aug 2001 09:25:03 -0400 From: Rachel Slatkin <rslatkin () pobox com> Subject: GA scholarship info exposed Computer passwords and personal information about participants in Georgia's HOPE scholarship program were inadvertently exposed on the web as early as December 2000. The information was apparently cached by several search engines, including Google. From the *Atlanta Journal Constitution*, 8 Aug 2001, "State staff may feel byte from hackers": "Last Nov. 14, he said, a member of the agency's technical staff copied a file onto the HOPE computer system that prevents Internet search engines from indexing the system's contents. But another program in the system deletes unused files after 30 days, Newsome said. So about Dec. 15, the security file was wiped out, exposing other files." It's not clear what "security file" was accidentally removed. The news articles I've read about this have not named the file. I'm guessing it was either robots.txt or .htaccess, hopefully the latter. Many system administrators have discovered the risks of deleting "unused" files without being sure of their purpose. Having the procedure happen automatically compounds the problem. Rachel Slatkin rslatkin () pobox com http://pobox.com/~rslatkin/ ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 2 Aug 2001 20:06:05 -0400 From: Dug Song <dugsong () arbor net> Subject: DoCoMo and thttpd: i-mode DDoS attack! Poor jef has become the victim of his own success (and DoCoMo's)! Perhaps this qualifies as the first cellphone-based (i-mode) distributed denial-of-service attack? :-/ Dug Song, Security Architect, Arbor Networks, Inc. Date: Thu, 02 Aug 2001 11:22:14 -0700
From: Jef Poskanzer <jef () acme com>
To: thttpd () bomb acme com Subject: [THTTPD] DoCoMo and thttpd Hey, is anyone on the list familiar with DoCoMo? Apparently it's a type of cell-phone / web browser device from Japan. I have suddenly started getting a [whole] lot of hits to http://www.acme.com/software/thttpd/ with various versions of DoCoMo in the user-agent field. Unfortunately the referrer field is blank, which makes it difficult to figure out why this is happening. Current working theory is that some server run by the DoCoMo company switched over to using thttpd, and I'm getting the usual spillover from any 404 pages on their site. I've seen this effect before with large ISPs, but never with such a high volume of hits. My bandwidth is pegged to the throttle right now, and they're not even fetching the inline images (which by the way means I'm not getting any ad impressions from these hits, which is somewhat annoying). [...] Jef Poskanzer jef () acme com http://www.acme.com/jef/ ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 07 Aug 2001 22:31:48 -0700 From: Gene Wirchenko <genew () shuswap net> Subject: Low-Grade Cryptography DMCA and encryption is discussed in this article: http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/comment/0,5859,2800985,00.html My favourite part: "Publishers encrypt their books to prevent them from being read by anyone except the registered owner... they hope. But it turns out that the encryption software of at least two manufacturers is so weak that it can be broken instantly. One publisher, Sklyarov found, uses a cypher called rot13 ...". [Doggedly rot-wily? PGN] ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 05 Aug 2001 12:03:57 -0700 From: dAVe <kinswa () mail com> Subject: Automated traffic-camera system has flaws
From the Seattle Times:
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/134326067_trafficam05m.html It was not the kind of "Kodak moment" the city of Lakewood hoped for. Its high-tech traffic camera had just nabbed Cyn Mason for doing 38 in a 30-mph zone. The camera captured the license plate on the Tacoma woman's car as it sped through a school zone June 8. Or so it seemed. After receiving a notice, a thumbnail copy of the incriminating image and a demand for $71, Mason put pen to paper: "This is my sworn statement, under penalty of perjury, that your system cannot distinguish between the sporty coupe shown in the ticket picture, and the Honda CR-V sport-utility vehicle that I drive. In other words, I swear that you have the wrong car, since the one shown in the ticket is not my vehicle. Is this sufficient to correct your error, or would you like me to swear at you some more?" ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 6 Aug 2001 22:35:53 -0400 From: Monty Solomon <monty () roscom com> Subject: Risks of the Passport Single Signon Protocol David P. Kormann and Aviel D. Rubin, Risks of the Passport Single Signon Protocol, IEEE Computer Networks, volume 33, pages 51-58, 2000. David P. Kormann and Aviel D. Rubin AT&T Labs - Research 180 Park Avenue Florham Park, NJ 07932 {davek,rubin}@research.att.com http://avirubin.com/passport.html Abstract: Passport is a protocol that enables users to sign onto many different merchants' web pages by authenticating themselves only once to a common server. This is important because users tend to pick poor (guessable) user names and passwords and to repeat them at different sites. Passport is notable as it is being very widely deployed by Microsoft. At the time of this writing, Passport boasts 40 million consumers and more than 400 authentications per second on average. We examine the Passport single signon protocol, and identify several risks and attacks. We discuss a flaw that we discovered in the interaction of Passport and Netscape browsers that leaves a user logged in while informing him that he has successfully logged out. Finally, we suggest several areas of improvement. ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 08 Aug 2001 18:01:34 -0400 From: Brian McWilliams <brian () pc-radio com> Subject: Hotmail catches Code Red (via Dave Farber's IP) [From Dave Farber's IP: http://www.interesting-people.org/ ] Microsoft's Hotmail Is Red Hot From Worm Several systems hosting the MSN Hotmail service have been infected by variants of the Code Red worm, Microsoft has confirmed. http://www.newsbytes.com/news/01/168837.html ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 02 Aug 2001 19:32:39 -0700 From: Arthur Kimes <artki () netzero net> Subject: Toll Road Transponders used to steal food at McDonald's (Re: R-21.43)
McDonald's customers will wave the "Speedpass" ... at a drive-through window
(also see RISKS-21.46 and 21.49) Some toll roads in Orange County, California, do use those transponders (not the Mobil "speedpass") and local McDonald's have been accepting those as payment since April 2000. Since then, according to the Transportation Corridor Agencies, there has been $4,000 in charges for food at McDonald's using stolen transponders. [Source: *Los Angeles Times*, 23 Jul 2001] ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 3 Aug 2001 09:10:36 -0400 From: Peter Wayner <pcw () flyzone com> Subject: More Adobe plastering (Re: Maggard, RISKS-21.56) In RISKS-21.56, Michael Maggard writes, "...Adobe has been installing a mysterious file of their own that regularly 'calls home' for reasons unknown." Perhaps this kind of reporting software is necessary, but it may be the reason why I'm slowly giving up on Adobe products. My version of InDesign crashes frequently. My version of ImageReady has the strangest bug. If my system has been up for a bit, ImageReady refuses to run. If I reboot, it's fine. I suspect this has something to do with the quick blip of the network access LED on the router that flickers just after starting up. Maybe that little phone-home program doesn't say the right thing to ImageReady. I thought about complaining or investigating, but I decided that making the transition to GIMP is simpler. This topic has been on my mind while I've been working on creating simple watermarks for a pay-per-copy experiment. (See http://www.flyzone.com/satstory/ or just end $.75 to satstory () flyzone com for a copy of a story on DirecTV hacking) I considered complicated encryption mechanisms and gave up. The complexity took too long to develop and excluded too many legitimate customers. In the end, I just insert the purchaser's name in the file on the way out the door. This kind of watermark may be easy to defeat, but that has advantages. First, bright kids get no boost from hacking the system. It's trivial. But it is still complex enough to require someone to take a positive step to defeat it. If they can live with themselves, well, they'll get enough punishment. Finally, there is no complexity to crash systems and drive users nuts. ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 07 Aug 2001 20:33:15 -0700 From: Michael Loftis <mloftis () wgops com> Subject: Re: WinXP blocks some versions of some programs (Griffin, RISKS 21.57) They're blocking drivers because too many vendors have been implementing bad code in their drivers. ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 08 Aug 2001 14:23:15 -0700 From: David Chaum <david () chaum com> Subject: Workshop on Trustworthy Elections 26-29 August 2001, Tomales Bay, California: WOTE (Workshop on Trustworthy Elections) is a small research-oriented workshop devoted to advancing technologies for election integrity and ballot secrecy, organized by David Chaum and Ronald L. Rivest. Topics include: Cryptographic protocols, computer security, audit, operational procedures, certification, tamper-resistance, document security, integrity, ballot secrecy, voter authentication, all as related to trustworthy elections. http://www.vote.caltech.edu/wote01/index.html ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 7 Aug 2001 11:07:47 -0800 From: Rob Slade <rslade () sprint ca> Subject: REVIEW: "Computer Security Handbook", Hutt/Bosworth/Hoyt BKCMSCHB.RVW 20010530 "Computer Security Handbook", 1995, Arthur E. Hutt/Seymour Bosworth/ Douglas B. Hoyt, 0-471-11854-0 %E Arthur E. Hutt %E Seymour Bosworth %E Douglas B. Hoyt %C 5353 Dundas Street West, 4th Floor, Etobicoke, ON M9B 6H8 %D 1995 %G 0-471-11854-0 %I John Wiley & Sons, Inc. %O U$90.00 416-236-4433 fax: 416-236-4448 %T "Computer Security Handbook, Third Edition" Overall, this work appears to be strongly influenced from a time when computers were mainframes locked in glass rooms, and the information technology department was under the jurisdiction of accounting. Although some effort has been made to address more recent topics, the attempt is piecemeal at best, and quite limited in depth. Part one looks at the responsibility of management in the security concern. The first essay, specifying the role of management, certainly dates the work in the big iron era, defining security solely from the perspective of availability. Disclosure of information does get a mention, but even the list of risks to be considered concentrates primarily on malfunction or disaster. A second paper takes a rather vague look at policies and related documents, but is backed up with a number of examples. The review of risk analysis is similarly nebulous, although it does have some potentially useful tables of probable threats. Optimism about the availability of background information seems to surround the discussion of employee policies, but some important basic principles are presented. Legal issues are dealt with briefly, but over a wide range of topics. The article on computer crime is not particularly realistic: as one example, the examination of controls concentrates on provisions for preventing programmers from installing logic bombs, but the case studies actually cited as examples of the need for such controls were perpetrated as fraud by those in positions of authority. Part two outlines basic safeguards. Disaster recovery is, again, reviewed primarily from the mainframe perspective. The principles may be the same, but the important resources for a corporation probably involve many more aspects than just a mainframe and data. An overview of insurance sounds very much like a sales pitch, although it does divide the topic up by type of threat, and examines different factors that can affect price and the willingness of the insurers to make good on a loss. (I was amused to note that the section on viruses basically admits that vendors will use extraordinary interpretations of standard wording to weasel out of paying.) The chapter on auditing appears to have been written solely from an accounting perspective, and, while the points listed would be helpful in creating part of a security policy, they address only those issues related to internal fraud. System application controls are discussed strictly in terms of development cycles and ideas such as "total quality management" (TQM). Part three moves to physical protection. Hardware protection takes a detailed look at internal error situations right down to the gate level, as well as a more superficial examination of architecture concerns and environmental problems. Accidental calamities are also the major emphasis in computer facility protection, although there is some attention paid to the need to secure cabling. "Monitoring and Control Devices" presents theory behind surveillance and alarm systems. Part four starts to look into technical aspects of data security. A chapter on software and information security appears to have some valid points to make (aside from the misinformation on viruses) but is written in such a convoluted manner that most material must be read several times to puzzle out the meaning. An essay on records retention has been retrofitted to become an examination of computer data security. The paper on encryption is extremely disjointed (for example, dropping a discussion of network topologies into a purported explanation of the RSA [Rivest Shamir Adleman] encryption algorithm), and almost completely lacking in details. A rather generic security overview (with questionable virus information) is supposed to address data communications and networking. A grab bag of penetration techniques and countermeasures provides some interesting prompts to consider various attacks, but is not organized or complete enough to fully cover the subject. The chapter on viruses and related threats is rife with errors, and confuses the various types of problems with each other as well as with unverified speculation. Part five deals with special protection issues. Chapter twenty suggests that you might want to be a little careful when dealing with outside contractors. While there is some disorganization, and a few odd anachronisms, the paper on personal computers is much more practical than most of the preceding material. The essay on LANs presents a primer on networks, and then a generic overview of security, without an awful lot of relation between the two. The chapter on Internet security has some basic information, but is quite disorganized. Supplements are supposedly produced to update the work. Some such documents ask you to replace paragraphs and correct errors: others offer additional sections to enhance the original essays. In the 1997 supplement (ISBN 0-471-17297-9) there are some weak addenda for auditing, encryption, and viruses, as well as a decent, though still disorganized, extension to the Internet material. There is also a first rate examination of e-mail privacy issues and a reasonable though uninspired review of single sign-on. When I contacted the publisher, I was told that the 2000 supplement was still in the editorial stage. In fact, so was the 1998 supplement! So I wouldn't expect any updates for the book in the near future. Most of the material is fairly obviously old, and originally intended to address topics applicable solely to mainframe computer establishments, or even non-computerized systems. Patchwork updating is evidently an afterthought. A great deal of material is repeated many times over in different essays. Generally the papers have little detail or depth, so the recapitulations do not add much new content each time. There is useful material in the work, but it is difficult to abstract the good from the outdated and mundane unless you are already quite expert in the field. The newcomer would be advised to get some basic training or reading before attempting to deal with this work, but the expert will be able to find some useful nuggets. copyright Robert M. Slade, 2001 BKCMSCHB.RVW 20010530 rslade () vcn bc ca rslade () sprint ca slade () victoria tc ca p1 () canada com http://victoria.tc.ca/techrev or http://sun.soci.niu.edu/~rslade ------------------------------ Date: 12 Feb 2001 (LAST-MODIFIED) From: RISKS-request () csl sri com Subject: Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks) The RISKS Forum is a MODERATED digest. Its Usenet equivalent is comp.risks. => SUBSCRIPTIONS: PLEASE read RISKS as a newsgroup (comp.risks or equivalent) if possible and convenient for you. Alternatively, via majordomo, send e-mail requests to <risks-request () csl sri com> with one-line body subscribe [OR unsubscribe] which requires your ANSWERing confirmation to majordomo () CSL sri com . [If E-mail address differs from FROM: subscribe "other-address <x@y>" ; this requires PGN's intervention -- but hinders spamming subscriptions, etc.] Lower-case only in address may get around a confirmation match glitch. 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Lindsay Marshall has also added to the Newcastle catless site a palmtop version of the most recent RISKS issue and a WAP version that works for many but not all telephones: http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/w/r http://the.wiretapped.net/security/info/textfiles/risks-digest/ . http://www.planetmirror.com/pub/risks/ ftp://ftp.planetmirror.com/pub/risks/ ==> PGN's comprehensive historical Illustrative Risks summary of one liners: http://www.csl.sri.com/illustrative.html for browsing, http://www.csl.sri.com/illustrative.pdf or .ps for printing ------------------------------ End of RISKS-FORUM Digest 21.58 ************************
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