Secure Coding mailing list archives

BSIMM: Confessions of a Software Security Alchemist (informIT)


From: gem at cigital.com (Gary McGraw)
Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2009 15:00:03 -0400

Aloha Jim,

I agree that security bugs should not necessarily take precedence over other bugs.  Most of the initiatives that we 
observed cycled ALL security bugs into the standard bug tracking system (most of which rank bugs by some kind of 
severity rating).  Many initiatives put more weight on security bugs...note the term "weight" not "drop everything and 
run around only working on security."  See the CMVM practice activities for more.

The BSIMM helps to measure and then evolve a software security initiative.  The top N security bugs activity is one of 
an arsenal of tools built and used by the SSG to strategically guide the rest of their software security initiative.  
Making this a "top N bugs of any kind" list might make sense for some organizations, but is not something we would 
likely observe by studying the SSG and the software security initiative.  Perhaps we suffer from the "looking for the 
keys under the streetlight" problem.

gem


On 3/19/09 2:31 PM, "Jim Manico" <jim at manico.net> wrote:

The top N lists we observed among the 9 were BUG lists only.  So that
means that in general at least half of the defects were not being
identified on the "most wanted" list using that BSIMM set of activities.

This sounds very problematic to me. There are many standard software bugs
that are much more critical to the enterprise than just security bugs. It
seems foolhardy to do risk assessment on security bugs only - I think we
need to bring the worlds of software development and security analysis
together more. Divided we (continue to) fail.

And Gary, this is not a critique of just your comment, but of WebAppSec at
large.

- Jim


----- Original Message -----
From: "Gary McGraw" <gem at cigital.com>
To: "Steven M. Christey" <coley at linus.mitre.org>
Cc: "Sammy Migues" <SMigues at cigital.com>; "Michael Cohen"
<MCohen at cigital.com>; "Dustin Sullivan" <dustin.sullivan at informit.com>;
"Secure Code Mailing List" <SC-L at securecoding.org>
Sent: Thursday, March 19, 2009 2:50 AM
Subject: Re: [SC-L] BSIMM: Confessions of a Software Security Alchemist
(informIT)


Hi Steve,

Sorry for falling off the thread last night.  Waiting for the posts to
clear was not a great idea.

The top N lists we observed among the 9 were BUG lists only.  So that
means that in general at least half of the defects were not being
identified on the "most wanted" list using that BSIMM set of activities.
You are correct to point out that the "Architecture Analysis" practice has
other activities meant to ferret out those sorts of flaws.

I asked my guys to work on a flaws collection a while ago, but I have not
seen anything yet.  Canuck?

There is an important difference between your CVE data which is based on
externally observed bugs (imposed on vendors by security types mostly) and
internal bug data determined using static analysis or internal testing.  I
would be very interested to know whether Microsoft and the CVE consider
the same bug #1 on internal versus external rating systems.  The
difference is in the term "reported for" versus "discovered internally
during SDL activity".

gem

http://www.cigital.com/~gem


On 3/18/09 6:14 PM, "Steven M. Christey" <coley at linus.mitre.org> wrote:



On Wed, 18 Mar 2009, Gary McGraw wrote:

Many of the top N lists we encountered were developed through the
consistent use of static analysis tools.

Interesting.  Does this mean that their top N lists are less likely to
include design flaws?  (though they would be covered under various other
BSIMM activities).

After looking at millions of lines of code (sometimes constantly), a
***real*** top N list of bugs emerges for an organization.  Eradicating
number one is an obvious priority.  Training can help.  New number
one...lather, rinse, repeat.

I believe this is reflected in public CVE data.  Take a look at the bugs
that are being reported for, say, Microsoft or major Linux vendors or most
any product with a long history, and their current number 1's are not the
same as the number 1's of the past.

- Steve


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