Re: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Account Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes

[<pressinfo () diebold com>]

In-Reply-To: <20040831203815.13871.qmail () www securityfocus com>

Diebold strongly refutes the existence of any "back doors" or "hidden codes" in its GEMS software.  These inaccurate 
allegations appear to stem from those not familiar with the product, misunderstanding the purpose of legitimate 
structures in the database.  These structures are well documented and have been reviewed (including at a source code 
level) by independent testing authorities as required by federal election regulations.
 
In addition to the facts stated above, a paper and an electronic record of all cast ballots are retrieved from each 
individual voting machine following an election. The results from each individual machine are then tabulated, and 
thoroughly audited during the standard election canvass process. Once the audit is complete, the official winners are 
announced.  Any alleged changes to a vote count in the election management software would be immediately discovered 
during this audit process, as this total would not match the true official total tabulated from each machine.  


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> From: "Jérôme" ATHIAS <jerome.athias () caramail com>
> To: bugtraq () securityfocus com
> Subject: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Account
>    Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes
>
>
>
> Date:  Tue, 31 Aug 2004 00:38:05 -0400
> Subject:  http://www.blackboxvoting.org/?q=node/view/78
>
> BlackBoxVoting.org reported a vulnerability in the Diebold GEMS central tabulator.
>
> A local authenticated user can enter a two-digit code in a certain "hidden" location 
> to cause a second set of votes to be created on the system.  This second set of votes 
> can be modified by the local user and then read by the voting system as legitimate 
> votes, the report said.
>
> GEMS 1.18.18, GEMS 1.18.19, and GEMS 1.18.23 are affected.
>
> The vendor was reportedly notified on July 8, 2003.
>
>
> Solution:  No vendor solution was available at the time of this entry.
>
> Vendor URL:  www.diebold.com/dieboldes/GEMS.htm (Links to External Site)