Re: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Account Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes

[Coleman <cokane () cokane org>]

Here in Cincinnati, we've been using the punchcard system like the
infamous one in Florida for years. One thing that was not brought up in
this thread (or perhaps I missed it) is that the punchcard system can
pretty much be considered a low-tech "Open-Source" solution. The concept
of the system is quite simple, you use a pin to push out chads in a
punch card, and so everyone can understand it. In addition, after voting
any voter may (and should be) inspecting their cards to make sure the
punched holes are completely punched and there are no half-punches. You
should also count the number of punches you make to verify that they
match the punches on the card when you remove it. You should also have
checked your punchcard before using it to ensure that none of the chads
are pre-punched out. If you ever punch wrong, change your mind, don't
like the punchcard you got, or feel like hanging out at the booth
longer, you may go up and ask for a brand new card, you don't need a
legitimate excuse to do so.

This system inherently has a good deal of voter-based auditing built
into it. Any voter who goes up and discriminating voters can be pretty
confident that their card is operating correctly by inspecting it
themselves. The way Diebold's system is built, such auditing is
impossible.

Also to address the "Free Enterprise" claim. Free enterprise works well
for me buying what coffee I want, buying clothes, or which airline I
want to fly out to Chicago. The election system is not something to be
left up to "Free Enterprise", it should be scrutinized, regulated, and
IMHO be placed into the hands of an independent NPO funded by the public
to design such a system, openly. We have public forums on public works
projects, and even large development projects managed by community
planning departments. We fund public studies of transportation projects
5 years in advance of any groundbreaking in order to do an impact study.
Similar measures should be used in moving to a new voter registration
system.

On Sun, 2004-09-26 at 13:31, Mike Healan wrote:
> > And I'd strongly discourage folks from calling for open source, as it plays
> > directly into the hands of folks like Diebold, who claim that the people
> > (like me) who want Voter Verified Paper Audit Trails (VVPATs) are really
> > trying to kill free enterprise.  
>
> I understand your point but I disagree with it entirely.
>
> Yes, I'm sure they'll grasp at any FUD they can to head off what they do 
> not want. IMHO that shouldn't stop the call for open source software 
> (OSS) to run those voting machines. Killing off free enterprise is 
> clearly not the reason why people want OSS as, as you say, it is a 
> different issue entirely.
>
> Australia's voting machines are electronic and the software running them 
> is OSS. They don't seem to be having any problems with it. It must be 
> nice to be able to fully trust that the vote just cast was recorded 
> properly. That's a feeling I don't have here at home.
>
> Personally, I want a voting machine running code that any suspicious 
> geek can double (triple, quadruple, etc) check and that verifies to me, 
> on paper, that it recorded exactly which votes I cast. Considering that 
> the future of the world's only global superpower depends on the outcome, 
> I don't think that's too much to ask.
>
> Points 2 and 3 I'll agree with.
>
> > (4) WRT getting one set of software approved, and then installing another...
> > that's an old problem in any environment.
>
> If I recall correctly, this is exactly what Diebold has been accused of 
> doing in at least two states (Georgia, which concerns me directly, and 
> California), has been sued for it and has even had their software 
> decertified for it.
>
> Maybe OSS should be used and maybe it shouldn't. Given Diebold's record 
> to date, I believe they should be barred from making *any* of these 
> machines. I don't trust them and I sincerely hope I don't see their name 
> stamped on the voting machine I use in 5 weeks.
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Mike Healan
> Editor
> www.spywareinfo.com
>
>
> Jeremy Epstein wrote:
> > As someone who's been involved in the electronic voting controversy, I'd
> > like to add a few points:
> >
> > (1) I agree that source code should be inspected by someone truly
> > independent and competent, and that the standards for approving voting
> > machines should be stronger.  However, that's NOT the same as open source.
> > And I'd strongly discourage folks from calling for open source, as it plays
> > directly into the hands of folks like Diebold, who claim that the people
> > (like me) who want Voter Verified Paper Audit Trails (VVPATs) are really
> > trying to kill free enterprise.  [Yes, I know all the examples of businesses
> > based on open source, but that's not what this is about.]  As an example,
> > Harris Miller, the president of ITAA (www.itaa.org), a politically
> > influential consortium of technology vendors, is on record as having equated
> > the VVPAT groups with the open source community.  So rather than putting
> > your energy into trying to get Diebold et al to move to open source, it
> > would be far more productive to put your energy into VVPATs.  Towards that
> > end, I'll encourage everyone participating in this discussion to look at
> > www.verifiedvoting.org.  VVPATs can give us the assurance we need of
> > accurate elections, without delving into the political morass of open source
> > and related topics.
> >
> > (2) WRT the web page showing a "Sun server when discussing Windows", I hope
> > people realize that web pages for companies are made up by marketing people
> > who don't understand the difference.  Don't hold that against them... There
> > are plenty of real reasons to oppose Diebold.
> >
> > (3) WRT requiring that the technology protect itself in case the users
> > don't, that's simply unrealistic.  In *any* real computer system, there are
> > expectations about the environment (e.g., the administrators aren't hostile
> > to the functioning of the system).  It's important to state what those
> > expectations are, but there will ALWAYS be some that rely on non-technical
> > means.  The important part about election systems is that they be explicitly
> > stated, and they be enforceable using non-technical means (e.g., by having
> > locks on doors).  The problem today is that some of the assumptions (e.g.,
> > the vendor provided software doesn't have any bugs) are clearly unrealistic.
> >
> > (4) WRT getting one set of software approved, and then installing another...
> > that's an old problem in any environment.  The way it's supposed to work in
> > election systems is that a particular version is approved, and it's illegal
> > for the vendor to install something different.  If there are teeth in the
> > law, and the vendor can be fined for installing illegal software, then it's
> > a reasonable non-technical measure.  Of course, one could also use things
> > like cryptographic checksums to verify that what's installed is what was
> > approved.  That still requires non-technical elements, such as that the
> > people who ran the checksums weren't deliberately trying to cover up a
> > change, the checksums were protected from tampering, the software that
> > calculated the checksums wasn't subverted, etc.  [For those of us old enough
> > to remember, vendors were required to address this as part of "Orange Book"
> > evaluations, and are now required to address it as part of Common Criteria
> > evaluations.]
> >
> > Bottom line, election systems are no different than any other systems in
> > that the security of the whole system is based on risk management.  While we
> > should have higher expectations of election software than office automation
> > software, let's recognize what it is.  IMHO, VVPATs are the only real way to
> > go.
> >
> > --Jeremy