Questions about MD5+CA

[Dave Aitel <dave () immunityinc com>]

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So if someone was able to get a root CA for $20000 - shouldn't we
remove the RapidSSL root CA from our browsers with the next browser
update? I don't see why people think this would be hard to replicate
and hasn't been done previously to RapidSSL. Is it because no one
other than that one team can do math or buy PS3s?

Microsoft's advisory on this is essentially defaulting to the "No one
else has ever done this" position. This is weird. Trusted Roots that
could have been used to sign these things need to get re-issued,
right? What am I missing here?

"You fail and are no longer trusted" seems like a viable option here
that people are avoiding for some reason.

- -dave

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