IDS mailing list archives
FW: Honeytokens and detection
From: "Pete Herzog" <lists () isecom org>
Date: Thu, 24 Apr 2003 19:02:56 +0200
Sorry for the delay; I thought about this for a while. While it may be necessary to use internally generated honeytokens to keep them extra secret (TM) what if these were updated every so often? What if they were changed and distributed through a trusted network (partners who share policy on what to do if the token shows up on their radar screen) with say common IDS sigs in both compressed and standard forms? What if after 3 months, these sigs were then released in the wild for anyone to update and help track (an expanded partner network). I see the use here for both the common ones (like the eicar test script for AV) and home spun ones. Even some who "call home" somehow. A heterogeneous mix would ensure viability of the honeytokens but only large collaboration would make it worthwhile to use over the Internet. Of course I also see tremendous privacy violation possibilities in this technology. Doubleclick meets Honeytoken meets RIAA meets DMCA anyone? One ring to bind them.... Scary stuff. I'd rather we begin collaborative work on this first and expand the knowledge and use as we come to terms with the ethics. Sincerely, -pete. Pete Herzog Managing Director ISECOM www.isecom.org www.osstmm.org -----Original Message----- From: AQBARROS () BKB com br [mailto:AQBARROS () BKB com br] Sent: Tuesday, April 15, 2003 7:29 PM To: fknobbe () knobbeits com; lists () isecom org Cc: david () zbonski com; lance () honeynet org; FOCUS-IDS () securityfocus com Subject: RES: Honeytokens and detection I think that we cannot forget that honeytokens were already here for a long time, and that they aren't the final solution for tracking malicious activity. They are just one more tool. A tool that has serious limitations when we deal with encryption and compression. As for the fake administrator, you can use it as a real valid user, with a random password with maximum size. Whenever you detect someone trying to use it (you can do it detecting the traffic or watching logs), the alarm rings. I see honeytokens, as well as honeypots, being used as part of a intrusion detection and prevention strategy. It's wise to not overestimate its possibilities. Regards, Augusto. -----Mensagem original----- De: Frank Knobbe [mailto:fknobbe () knobbeits com] Enviada em: segunda-feira, 14 de abril de 2003 0:07 Para: lists () isecom org Cc: david () zbonski com; lance () honeynet org; FOCUS-IDS () securityfocus com Assunto: RE: Honeytokens and detection On Tue, 2003-04-08 at 15:57, Pete Herzog wrote:
I disagree. I think you may not get the illustration in full. If the
bogus
CCs or ID numbers were known and padded into excel sheets, particular DBs, etc., especially those with thousands of numbers, the thief would be downloading the whole thing at once. It would not be about downloading
only
part of the DB or part of an Excel sheet as long as the dangerous ones
don't
get downloaded. Since it's downloaded in bulk, the IDS will look for that token somewhere
in
the download (or upload). [...]
Pete, I almost agreed with you, but then I started to think about some scenarios. a) Someone breaks into the database server. He pokes around and looks at a few records (most likely unencrypted). b) Someone breaks into the database server. Since the database is very large, he only samples the top 100 rows of data so he can retrieve a few numbers to buy himself a new watchamacallit. It's debatable if he could choose to encrypt the transfer, although chances are better. c) Someone breaks into the database server. Circumstances (size, bandwidth, time) are favorable to download the whole database. If the attacker does not encrypt the transfer, he would most likely compress the data. So, if data is bulk harvested, partially or in full, both encryption and compression would render the honeytokens useless. Casual snooping would have a higher probability to occur in clear text, but less of a chance to hit a honey token. I'm wondering how useful the honeytokens really are for a) professional thieves (encryption) and b) large datasets (high miss/hit ratio). Note that we are only talking about detection of data in transit, not of detection of data in use (as would be the case with copy-bugs etc.... you know, those intentional typos in documents to mark them). Augusto's reference to the fake administrator/root account would probably fall into the 'detect on use' category, not into the 'detect in transit' category. (i.e. administrator account in network packet) Perhaps we need to define classification structure of honeytokens. Your thoughts? Regards, Frank Esta mensagem, incluindo seus anexos, pode conter informação confidencial e/ou privilegiada. Se você recebeu este e-mail por engano, não utilize, copie ou divulgue as informações nele contidas. E, por favor, avise imediatamente o remetente, respondendo ao e-mail, e em seguida apague-o. Este e-mail possui conteúdo informativo e não transacional. Caso necessite de atendimento imediato, recomendamos utilizar um dos canais disponíveis: Internet Banking , BankBoston por telefone ou agência/representante de atendimento de sua conveniência. Agradecemos sua colaboração. This message, including its attachments, may contain confidential and/or privileged information. If you received this email by mistake, do not use, copy or disseminate any information herein contained. Please notify us immediately by replying to the sender and then delete it. This email is for information purposes only, not for transactions. In case you need immediate assistance, please use one of the following channels: Internet Banking , BankBoston by phone or branch/relationship manager at your convenience. Thank you for your cooperation. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ INTRUSION PREVENTION: READY FOR PRIME TIME? IntruShield now offers unprecedented Intrusion IntelligenceTM capabilities - including intrusion identification, relevancy, direction, impact and analysis - enabling a path to prevention. Download the latest white paper "Intrusion Prevention: Myths, Challenges, and Requirements" at: http://www.securityfocus.com/IntruVert-focus-ids
Current thread:
- Honeytokens and detection Lance Spitzner (Apr 03)
- Re: Honeytokens and detection Michael Sierchio (Apr 03)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- RE: Honeytokens and detection Grant, Liam (Apr 04)
- Re: Honeytokens and detection David Zbonski (Apr 07)
- RE: Honeytokens and detection Pete Herzog (Apr 11)
- RE: Honeytokens and detection Frank Knobbe (Apr 14)
- RE: Honeytokens and detection Pete Herzog (Apr 11)
- FW: Honeytokens and detection Pete Herzog (Apr 24)
- RE: FW: Honeytokens and detection Pete Herzog (Apr 28)