IDS mailing list archives
RE: signature based IDS/IPS effectiveness
From: "Nelson Brito" <nbrito () sekure org>
Date: Thu, 10 Jan 2008 16:00:53 -0200
Hi, fellows!!! GMail, is depends on how the IDS/IPS approaches the detection of any or all vulnerabilities. About two months ago, maybe more, I got a discussion about the thread regarding pattern matching weakness. Some of the IDS/IPS technology still uses the pattern matching as their primary technology, using others technologies helping to decrease the false-positives or even increasing the detection of false-negatives. If you can configure customized signatures to detect a real vulnerability you will be able to stop the annoying false-positives. And when I say signatures to detect vulnerability I'm not talking about the detection of the return-address, the detection of the shellcode, etc... If you are able to tell your IDS/IPS to detection a buffer size, not NULL, with all the variables the vulnerability must have to become exploitable... So you are able to do whatever you want. Best regards. Nelson Brito (f.k.a. stderr) Sekure SDI's Member since 1999
-----Original Message----- From: listbounce () securityfocus com [mailto:listbounce () securityfocus com] On Behalf Of GMail Sent: Thursday, January 10, 2008 8:02 AM To: Jamie Riden Cc: focus-ids () securityfocus com Subject: Re: signature based IDS/IPS effectiveness Thanks Jamie and Stefano for noticing my issues, 90% of commercial database specific IDS/IPS systems do "signature matching" exploit detection. They are stateless and mostly based on snort. So does this mean that all they can do is stop public exploits. If someone modifies the exploit then the signatures will fail and by that means the appliances too ? Limiting privileges to minimum required levels and installing minimum required of modules on databases will definitely reduce the risk ratio, but is it sufficient? What about vulnerabilities by which normal user can get superuser privileges or carry out DOS on database services. Is there any way to stop these kinds of attacks? Which would be the best available database security product to handle all these issues? -------------------------------------------------------------- ---------- Test Your IDS Is your IDS deployed correctly? Find out quickly and easily by testing it with real-world attacks from CORE IMPACT. Go to http://www.coresecurity.com/index.php5?module=Form&action=impa
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------------------------------------------------------------------------ Test Your IDS Is your IDS deployed correctly? Find out quickly and easily by testing it with real-world attacks from CORE IMPACT. Go to http://www.coresecurity.com/index.php5?module=Form&action=impact&campaign=intro_sfw to learn more. ------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current thread:
- Re: Preventing layer 3/4 evasions Martin Roesch (Jan 07)
- Re: Preventing layer 3/4 evasions Jeremy Bennett (Jan 09)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- RE: Preventing layer 3/4 evasions Mike Barkett (Jan 07)
- signature based IDS/IPS effectiveness GMail (Jan 09)
- Re: signature based IDS/IPS effectiveness Stefano Zanero (Jan 09)
- Looking for feedback on anomaly-based IDS systems Libershal, David M. (Jan 09)
- Re: Looking for feedback on anomaly-based IDS systems p1g (Jan 10)
- Re: signature based IDS/IPS effectiveness Jamie Riden (Jan 10)
- Re: signature based IDS/IPS effectiveness GMail (Jan 10)
- RE: signature based IDS/IPS effectiveness Nelson Brito (Jan 10)
- Re: signature based IDS/IPS effectiveness Paul Schmehl (Jan 10)
- signature based IDS/IPS effectiveness GMail (Jan 09)
- Message not available
- Re: signature based IDS/IPS effectiveness Jamie Riden (Jan 10)