Full Disclosure mailing list archives
Re: Calcuating Loss
From: "'Alexander Schreiber'" <als () thangorodrim de>
Date: Wed, 12 May 2004 21:02:01 +0200
On Wed, May 12, 2004 at 08:56:25AM -0700, Schmidt, Michael R. wrote:
Well one of the biggest issues that allows people to remain anonymous is DHCP.
No. Even Dialup (modem/ISDN), Cable or DSL users who get a new IP address on every reconnect or every $X hours can be traced back easily by their appropriate provider who can identifiy them by phone number of their line or by MAC. Although you do _not_ _identify_ _persons_ this way, only _equipment_ - which supposedly is linked to a person (think stolen cell phone - which is getting a more interesting target with UMTS due to the higher bandwith there (yes, I know a cell phones location can be pinpointed to within a few hundred meters or less)).
If everyone on the internet was required to get a static IP address, or to log which IP they were using - using a secure technology then everyone could be tracked, sure a few "super" hackers could still manage to escape detection I am sure,
No need for super hackers. All you need is one of the usual worms and the usual windows box. Or even better, a normal (read: unsecured) WaveLAN. Instant free net access or at least proxy.
but there is nothing that is the equivalent of a drivers license on the internet. Sure there would still be criminals using stolen credentials, but IPs are handed out based on location or where you dialed in from. Dialing in can be traced using caller ID, wireless by IP and base station proximity, so just like today, people would have a alibi for the time and place the criminal used their identity.
And if Joe Fool was at home while Jack Badguy drove within range of his WaveLAN (which was wide open because Joe Fool didn't know how to properly secure it) and used it to commit some nasty crime? Bang, Joe Fool is presumed guilty and ends up in prison? Well, that approach _would_ cut down on unsecured WaveLANs, if only by jailing most of the fools.
What we need is something that you have to log into (securely) or your DHCP is revoked immediately. And of course static IPs are well, static and since they are routed, routes can be logged and therefore trackable.
Well, this kind of control over the populace might work in The Land of The Free (aka USA), but good luck trying to enforce it in some less free places - like Nigeria, for instance.
So again it is anonymity that causes most of the grief. If all code had to be signed, then you'd know who wrote it, and running unsigned code would be your own stupid fault.
And trying to run code which the vendor of your code signing checker (for most this would be Microsoft, I'm afraid) does not approve for whatever shady reasons won't work either. Of course, criminals will still be able to turn out perfectly signed malware executables, there are more than enough ways to do this.
If you replace a part on some new cars with a non-manufacturers part, you void the warranty. But when you run unsigned downloaded for free or sent through email code on your dell, who do you call and expect to fix it when it stops working? The end user is the moron, we require no test to get on the internet and yet we let more people anonymously sign on the net everyday.
Wrong. You have to really work to get an anonymous link to the net. Basically: As long as you are paying for your internet connection, it is virtually guaranteed that it is _not_ anonymous. Your provider can track you down and thereby also the police. It is just a bit of work to identify the user. And if the police calls up an Internet provider and ask for the customer who used dialinpool711.provider.com 6 months ago, well, those logs are almost _certainly_ gone already. Your best bet at anonymous internet access is to still it without anybody noticing (open WaveLANs are probably best, public terminals can be a bad choice (think cameras)). Regards, Alex.
-----Original Message----- From: Alexander Schreiber [mailto:als () thangorodrim de] Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2004 10:34 PM To: Schmidt, Michael R. Cc: 'Frank Knobbe'; Valdis.Kletnieks () vt edu; Full-Disclosure Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Calcuating Loss On Tue, May 11, 2004 at 03:02:30PM -0700, Schmidt, Michael R. wrote:I think that part of the evolution is to lock people who create these things up for a *very* long time. It will deter the script kittens when they start to find that their computers are confiscated and their parents homes are sold to pay for the "loss" incurred by there stupidity. The real black hats will be deterred when 20 FBI/CIA whoever agents drag them from their homes at gunpoint with the handcuffs tight around there wrists.Dead wrong. All this will accomplish is the any malware author will just be one hell of a lot more careful to avoid getting caught. It might even accelerate another trend: malware by script kiddies who goes down, malware by real criminals (who use/sell the infected machines as spam relays, DDoS zombies (nice extortion tool, already used), ...) will go up. Net result: you ruined the live of a few foolish kids and their entire family, but you still don't get the (much more dangerous) professional criminals. Achievement for network security: NIL.The consequences need to be severe enough. In order to accomplish that our infrastructure has got to support the basic ability to find people who cause problems. Anonymity is not an option.Ever heard of identity theft? In the same way that the less stupid criminals don't use their own private cars but stolen ones for committing crimes, criminal malware authors will just use computers/accounts whose access credentials were stolen. You end up investigating a fool who got his access credentials stolen, but probably didn't do anything else. And you still have to find the real guy ... We really should take a lesson from the real world here: valuable property (like big bags full of money) are not usually left out on the kitchen table and only protected by strong penalties for anyone wandering in and grabbing a few - if you tried to rely on this, police and insurance would laugh you out of town. Instead, valueable physical property is protected by serious physical means of protection (like putting your bags full of cash into a big, heavy, unmovable safe) _and_ legislation to punish the few serious criminals who still manage to steal some. The way to protect digital infrastructure from the destructive effects of malware is to harden the infrastructure itself. Don't use insecure operating systems and hope that the 'patch of the day' will keep the malware out - because it won't. Don't use sloppily coded, insecure software on hope nothing bad will happen because nobody will find out how to exploit the flaws - because somebody will find out and exploits will happen. Don't build insecure networks and hope nobody will abuse them because nobody knows what a mess it is - because somebody will abuse them. In short: Don't build a house of cards and then try to outlaw the wind, build a house of stone and enjoy the fresh air. Yes, there are things that are very hard or practically impossible to guard against (DoS comes to mind), but practically all malware problems are due to avoidable failures: insecure configurations (like executing untrusted code from unknown sources by default), coding errors that could be avoided by using proper tools (like buffer overflows) and so on. Close the existing easy attack paths and then we can deal with the remaining few attackers with the law and a lot of attention. Regards, Alex. -- "Opportunity is missed by most people because it is dressed in overalls and looks like work." -- Thomas A. Edison _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
-- "Opportunity is missed by most people because it is dressed in overalls and looks like work." -- Thomas A. Edison _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
Current thread:
- Re: Calcuating Loss, (continued)
- Re: Calcuating Loss Alexander Schreiber (May 11)
- RE: Calcuating Loss Schmidt, Michael R. (May 12)
- Re: Calcuating Loss Valdis . Kletnieks (May 12)
- RE: Calcuating Loss Frank Knobbe (May 12)
- RE: Calcuating Loss Gary E. Miller (May 12)
- RE: Calcuating Loss Frank Knobbe (May 12)
- RE: Calcuating Loss Gary E. Miller (May 12)
- RE: Avoiding traceability (was: Calculating Loss) Frank Knobbe (May 12)
- RE: Avoiding traceability (was: Calculating Loss) Ron DuFresne (May 13)
- Re: Calcuating Loss Valdis . Kletnieks (May 13)