Full Disclosure mailing list archives

Re: Calcuating Loss


From: "'Alexander Schreiber'" <als () thangorodrim de>
Date: Wed, 12 May 2004 21:02:01 +0200

On Wed, May 12, 2004 at 08:56:25AM -0700, Schmidt, Michael R. wrote:
Well one of the biggest issues that allows people to remain anonymous
is DHCP. 

No. Even Dialup (modem/ISDN), Cable or DSL users who get a new IP
address on every reconnect or every $X hours can be traced back easily
by their appropriate provider who can identifiy them by phone number of
their line or by MAC. Although you do _not_ _identify_ _persons_ this way,
only _equipment_ - which supposedly is linked to a person (think stolen
cell phone - which is getting a more interesting target with UMTS due to
the higher bandwith there (yes, I know a cell phones location can be
pinpointed to within a few hundred meters or less)).

If everyone on the internet was required to get a static IP
address, or to log which IP they were using - using a secure technology
then everyone could be tracked, sure a few "super" hackers could still
manage to escape detection I am sure,

No need for super hackers. All you need is one of the usual worms and
the usual windows box. Or even better, a normal (read: unsecured)
WaveLAN. Instant free net access or at least proxy.

but there is nothing that is the equivalent of a drivers license on the
internet.

Sure there would still be criminals using stolen credentials, but IPs
are handed out based on location or where you dialed in from. Dialing
in can be traced using caller ID, wireless by IP and base station
proximity, so just like today, people would have a alibi for the time
and place the criminal used their identity.

And if Joe Fool was at home while Jack Badguy drove within range of his
WaveLAN (which was wide open because Joe Fool didn't know how to
properly secure it) and used it to commit some nasty crime? Bang, Joe
Fool is presumed guilty and ends up in prison? Well, that approach
_would_ cut down on unsecured WaveLANs, if only by jailing most of the
fools.

What we need is something that you have to log into (securely) or your
DHCP is revoked immediately.  And of course static IPs are well, static
and since they are routed, routes can be logged and therefore trackable.

Well, this kind of control over the populace might work in The Land of
The Free (aka USA), but good luck trying to enforce it in some less free
places - like Nigeria, for instance.

So again it is anonymity that causes most of the grief.  If all code had
to be signed, then you'd know who wrote it, and running unsigned code
would be your own stupid fault.

And trying to run code which the vendor of your code signing checker
(for most this would be Microsoft, I'm afraid) does not approve for
whatever shady reasons won't work either. Of course, criminals will
still be able to turn out perfectly signed malware executables, there
are more than enough ways to do this.

If you replace a part on some new cars with a non-manufacturers part, 
you void the warranty.  But when you run unsigned downloaded for free
or sent through email code on your dell, who do you call and expect to
fix it when it stops working?  The end user is the moron, we require no
test to get on the internet and yet we let more people anonymously sign
on the net everyday.

Wrong. You have to really work to get an anonymous link to the net.
Basically: As long as you are paying for your internet connection, it is
virtually guaranteed that it is _not_ anonymous. Your provider can track
you down and thereby also the police. It is just a bit of work to
identify the user. And if the police calls up an Internet provider and
ask for the customer who used dialinpool711.provider.com 6 months ago,
well, those logs are almost _certainly_ gone already.

Your best bet at anonymous internet access is to still it without anybody
noticing (open WaveLANs are probably best, public terminals can be a bad 
choice (think cameras)).

Regards,
       Alex.
-----Original Message-----
From: Alexander Schreiber [mailto:als () thangorodrim de]
Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2004 10:34 PM
To: Schmidt, Michael R.
Cc: 'Frank Knobbe'; Valdis.Kletnieks () vt edu; Full-Disclosure
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Calcuating Loss

On Tue, May 11, 2004 at 03:02:30PM -0700, Schmidt, Michael R. wrote:
I think that part of the evolution is to lock people who create these
things up for a *very* long time.  It will deter the script kittens
when they start to find that their computers are confiscated and their
parents homes are sold to pay for the "loss" incurred by there
stupidity.  The real black hats will be deterred when 20 FBI/CIA whoever
agents drag them from their homes at gunpoint with the handcuffs tight
around there wrists.

Dead wrong. All this will accomplish is the any malware author will just
be one hell of a lot more careful to avoid getting caught. It might even
accelerate another trend: malware by script kiddies who goes down,
malware by real criminals (who use/sell the infected machines as spam
relays, DDoS zombies (nice extortion tool, already used), ...) will go
up. Net result: you ruined the live of a few foolish kids and their
entire family, but you still don't get the (much more dangerous)
professional criminals. Achievement for network security: NIL.

The consequences need to be severe enough.  In order to accomplish that
our infrastructure has got to support the basic ability to find people
who cause problems.  Anonymity is not an option.

Ever heard of identity theft? In the same way that the less stupid
criminals don't use their own private cars but stolen ones for
committing crimes, criminal malware authors will just use
computers/accounts whose access credentials were stolen. You end up
investigating a fool who got his access credentials stolen, but probably
didn't do anything else. And you still have to find the real guy ...

We really should take a lesson from the real world here: valuable
property (like big bags full of money) are not usually left out on the
kitchen table and only protected by strong penalties for anyone
wandering in and grabbing a few - if you tried to rely on this, police and
insurance would laugh you out of town. Instead, valueable physical
property is protected by serious physical means of protection (like
putting your bags full of cash into a big, heavy, unmovable safe) _and_
legislation to punish the few serious criminals who still manage to
steal some.

The way to protect digital infrastructure from the destructive effects
of malware is to harden the infrastructure itself. Don't use insecure
operating systems and hope that the 'patch of the day' will keep the
malware out - because it won't. Don't use sloppily coded, insecure
software on hope nothing bad will happen because nobody will find out
how to exploit the flaws - because somebody will find out and exploits
will happen. Don't build insecure networks and hope nobody will abuse
them because nobody knows what a mess it is - because somebody will
abuse them.

In short: Don't build a house of cards and then try to outlaw the wind,
build a house of stone and enjoy the fresh air.

Yes, there are things that are very hard or practically impossible to
guard against (DoS comes to mind), but practically all malware problems
are due to avoidable failures: insecure configurations (like executing
untrusted code from unknown sources by default), coding errors that
could be avoided by using proper tools (like buffer overflows) and so
on. Close the existing easy attack paths and then we can deal with the
remaining few attackers with the law and a lot of attention.


Regards,
      Alex.
--
"Opportunity is missed by most people because it is dressed in overalls and
 looks like work."                                      -- Thomas A. Edison

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-- 
"Opportunity is missed by most people because it is dressed in overalls and
 looks like work."                                      -- Thomas A. Edison

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html


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