Re: Google / GMail bug, all accounts vulnerable

["Andrew A" <gluttony () gmail com>]

PS-- Have you managed to get hired in an actual security position yet or are
you running around San Francisco begging for scraps from our tables?

PPS-- Namedropping the head of a project you plagiarized from in your cover
letter is not good policy. Especially in this industry. Its a smaller world
than most, and now you're blackballed buddy. You'll work as desktop support
at FOX forever. On this list you may act like the lack of credit was some
sort of forgetful slip, but most people have been relayed by now that you
directly claimed authorship of said shellcode in an interview.

Sucks to be you, I guess.

On Dec 12, 2007 12:01 PM, Andrew A <gluttony () gmail com> wrote:

> Actually, the suggested prevention tactic is to create a post variable in
> your form of type "hidden" with a securely generated one-time ticket that an
> attacker would not be able to scrape without performing an xmlhttp call,
> therefore signalling a (real) security problem with the app in question.
> Requiring the user to re-input their login credentials for every database
> write would be absolutely ridiculous from both a design and security
> perspective.
>
> But then again, you must know all this with your extensive experience in
> web app security and development.
>
>
> On Dec 12, 2007 9:31 AM, Kristian Erik Hermansen <kristian.hermansen () gmail com>
> wrote:
>
> > On Dec 12, 2007 3:20 AM, ad () heapoverflow com <ad () heapoverflow com>
> > wrote:
> > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> > > Hash: SHA1
> > >
> > > ridiculous advisories are generating ridiculous replies that's well
> > > known and you figured it out.
> >
> > The data is all there.  So, the trick is how to utilize CSRF to
> > influence a large number of users to make requests which disrupt,
> > taint, or modify their accounts on popular services.  In the example,
> > I point the favicon.ico object as a 301 redirect to a GMail URI.
> > Since the favicon.ico object, for some reason, influences the account
> > even without revisiting the website again, the GMail account is again
> > influenced any time you click a tab.  It is an interesting finding,
> > and not one that I have heard ever publicly stated.  Correct me if I
> > am wrong here, but why would the favicon.ico object be requested every
> > time you merely click on a tab?  And does this only happen in FF, or
> > IE as well?   What other browser's exhibit this behavior and/or is it
> > supposed to be this way?
> >
> > However, in addition to all this, CSRF is getting to be more
> > dangerous.  Major sites are not protecting against a wide range of
> > attacks.  The suggested prevention tactic is to ask for a password
> > upon any account modifications.  However, this does not always seem to
> > be implemented.  Too, many requests can cause distress to a user which
> > do not necessarily modify their accounts.  For instance, it is
> > possible to taint the credibility of a remote user as well.  Say you
> > could inject searches on Youtube for 'kiddie porn', or make Google
> > requests for 'how to murder your wife'.  All of these are possible
> > attacks, frightening, and how would they be prevented?  This is
> > becoming a large issue, and why I wrote up the PoC for the specific
> > Google / GMail case.  It is possible that these type of attacks could
> > perhaps be used to incriminate someone in court based on secondary
> > evidence, if they were suspected of say, murdering their wife.  The
> > user's search history on Google have been subpoenaed before, and
> > injecting requests into someone's search history is frightening and
> > definitely needs to be addressed, don't you think?  The worst part
> > about all of this is that there doesn't seem to be a viable solution
> > at the moment, which is why everyone should start thinking about the
> > problems now.  There are some great papers which describe a few
> > methods, but one demonstrating the implications is still missing...
> > --
> > Kristian Erik Hermansen
> > "I have no special talent. I am only passionately curious."
> >
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