Re: Wondering

["steve pirk [egrep]" <steve () pirk com>]

On Thu, Oct 22, 2009 at 05:50, Rich Kulawiec <rsk () gsp org> wrote:

> On Wed, Oct 21, 2009 at 09:20:08PM -0700, Paul Ferguson wrote:
> > It doesn't have to be a "trusted admin" -- putting my "evil" cap on, it
> > could certainly be someone who impersonates a "trusted admin" or
> > "interested party".
>
> Right.  So now we have an existence proof that OnStar has this capability,
> and the problem reduces to figuring out how to exploit it.
>
> I wonder if anyone there has considered the consequences that would
> ensue should someone penetrate their security and send out the signal
> to shut them *all* down.
>
> ---Rsk
>
> Well, there is exploiting it, and there is mitigating it. I remember when a
group was implementing a cert authority, and was fairly impressed by the
checks. Master password in a safe, locked in a 5 sided cage welded to the
floor. Only 2 people and one facilities director had access, and there was a
"2 physical key" factor to gain access to the cage. _no_ network access out
of the cage, and all servers associated with the installation were inside
the cage.

Could the cage be exploited? Sure, but the last piece is the safe. That
takes a gun to a head methinks, and by then you probably have other issues.

I am just saying that those of us that can, do what we can to protect
things. I hate the phrase "disaster recovery". I much prefer disaster
mitigation, which when I think about it is pretty much what a lot of us here
also do. Cool.

Thanks for getting me thinking about this. hmmm.... How to make it so it
does not matter if an installation has been compromised...?

--steve
-- 
steve pirk
refiamerica.org
"father... the sleeper has awakened..." paul atreides - dune
kexp.org member august '09
Sent from Bremerton, WA, United States

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