Interesting People mailing list archives

Internet Policy] 'Smart' home devices used as weapons in website attack (was RE: [Chapter-delegates] Hack http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-37738823)


From: "Dave Farber" <farber () gmail com>
Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2016 05:13:48 -0400




Begin forwarded message:

From: Suzanne Woolf <suzworldwide () gmail com>
Date: October 23, 2016 at 2:13:51 PM EDT
To: David Sarokin <sarokin () gmail com>
Cc: "internetpolicy () elists isoc org" <internetpolicy () elists isoc org>, Glenn McKnight <mcknight.glenn () gmail 
com>, ISOC Chapter Delegates <chapter-delegates () elists isoc org>
Subject: Re: [Internet Policy] 'Smart' home devices used as weapons in website attack (was RE: [Chapter-delegates] 
Hack http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-37738823)

I may live to regret this, but….

NB: I have no specific details on what happened to Dyn. I'm generally familiar with them (I know a lot of their 
engineers, who are world-class, and I'm a very small-scale customer), and I know a few things about the DNS business 
and how the internet works. I've been operating DNS services in networks large and small since the mid-1990s, and I 
co-chair a working group in the IETF that reviews DNS-related topics such as best practices for DNS operators. So my 
major qualification to comment may be that I do get to hear a wide variety of complaints about DNS.

As a general observation, I'll say that there's actually quite a lot of redundancy built into the way Dyn and 
services like it operate. The same is true of those they depend on, such as transit providers. (That's why we can 
surmise that it takes a truly massive amount of traffic to cause problems for them, and why even under Friday's 
challenges, the problems seemed to be localized in particular ways.) It's also possible today to have diversity of 
providers for managed DNS services, and many businesses do. Many others don't, by choice-- because their risk 
analysis doesn't support the additional cost and complexity, or because they have their DNS closely integrated with 
their web content or other internet activities in ways that make it difficult to work with more than one provider.

When I did business development for a company whose offerings included managed DNS, I and all of my major competitors 
often counseled large customers with key dependencies on public-facing DNS to diversify in every way they could-- 
services within one provider's offerings, multiple providers, and whatever expertise they needed to maintain in-house 
in order to monitor their vendors and react to situations that might be overwhelming for one provider. Some did, some 
didn't. 

I'm the last person on earth to argue that the protocol, operations, software, and business models that support DNS 
are perfect. DNS has, in fact, lots of problems that are specific to DNS as a naming system, to how nameservers work, 
etc. (For instance, I've seen arguments that blockchain-based architectures would work better than hierarchical ones 
based on client-server protocols in reducing vulnerability to denial-of-service attacks. But the arguments about 
which functionality you're protecting-- creating names? updating mappings associated with them? lookups?-- get arcane 
really fast, and I'm not sure I believe them.) There's a lot of interesting research to be done on such topics, to be 
sure, and if you know people who might want to fund it I know people who might want to do it-- but in the meantime, 
vulnerability to massive DDoS isn't specific to DNS or naming.

To your direct question: I don't believe the takeaway here is that either the architecture or the business model 
don't support "multiple paths for any given task" or are special in that they "invite attacks." DNS is *not* the only 
service on the internet that faces a massive-scale DDoS threat, or faces a threat that has taken a big step up with 
recent "innovations" such as the Mirai attacks on IoT nodes. The entire infrastructure is at risk, from DNS providers 
through ISPs and CDNs and your favorite "cloud provider", because small, cheap, un-maintainable, almost unnoticeably 
low-profile devices are enormously easier to add to the network than they are to fix, and enormously easier to 
mobilize against others than to defend against. 

It's a classic problem of asymmetric resource use, and the advantage right now is with the attacker. Which provider 
or which service is being attacked (DNS, web hosting, CDNs, routing) is not trivial but is also IMO not the main 
point.


Suzanne
(speaking for myself)

On Oct 23, 2016, at 12:44 PM, David Sarokin <sarokin () gmail com> wrote:

McTim wrote: ...I think the policy implications are that security standards for IoT devices need to be implemented,

I'm pretty sure everyone is on board with that one. But it seems there are implications at the nameserver end as 
well. The Internet is designed to be redundant, with multiple paths for accomplishing any given task.  If Dyn and 
others are becoming pinch points that are lacking this flexibility and redundancy, then it might be time to go back 
to the drawing board. There's no need to have this sort of Achilles Heel that just invites attacks. 



On Sun, Oct 23, 2016 at 11:04 AM, McTim <dogwallah () gmail com> wrote:
Hi,

Dyn is a world class DNS provider, anycast IIRC, loads of instances at/near many well connected peering points.  
IIUC, they didn't "go down" completely in that there was reachability to some nameservers, but not to others.

In terms of "system wide vulnerability", If folk like twitter use more than one DNS provider, THEN requests would 
bounce to another service.

DDOSes mean to overwhelm a server or servers, in this case hard to say what actual target was.

I think the policy implications are that security standards for IoT devices need to be implemented, that is a tough 
row to hoe when neither the buyer or seller of these devices care much about security.  Attitudes may change now 
however.

rgds,

McTim

On Sun, Oct 23, 2016 at 8:45 AM, David Sarokin <sarokin () gmail com> wrote:
I was wondering when (or if) this list would start a conversation on this latest and greatest DDOS disruption? 
Thanks for the BBC post. The media are almost all focused on how babycams and thermostats are being hijacked for 
nefarious purposes. But I've seen very little actual insight about Dyn, and why it turned out to be such a 
system-wide vulnerability. Isn't there redundancy built into the network, so that if DNS service is blocked at 
Dyn, the request bounces to another service?  Was the DDOS targeting something other than DNS lookup?

There are a lot of very experienced folk on this list. I'd love to see some discussion of this event -- and its 
policy implications -- that goes beyond what the press have been able to provide thus far. 

Thanks, all....

On Sun, Oct 23, 2016 at 3:20 AM, Richard Hill <rhill () hill-a ch> wrote:
Dear Glenn,

 

Thank you very much for this, which I am cross-posting to the Internet Policy list.  Such attacks have been 
reported before, and this article provides a very good summary.

 

I love the quip at the end: "In a relatively short time we've taken a system built to resist destruction by 
nuclear weapons and made it vulnerable to toasters," said Jeff Jarmoc, head of security for global business 
service Salesforce.

 

Best,

Richard

 

From: Chapter-delegates [mailto:chapter-delegates-bounces () elists isoc org] On Behalf Of Glenn McKnight
Sent: Sunday, October 23, 2016 00:27
To: ISOC Chapter Delegates
Subject: [Chapter-delegates] Hack http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-37738823

 

'Smart' home devices used as weapons in website attack
 

http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-37738823



Glenn McKnight
mcknight.glenn () gmail com
skype  gmcknight
twitter gmcknight
.


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