nanog mailing list archives

Re: "Default" Internet Service


From: Owen DeLong <owen () delong com>
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 2004 15:59:59 -0700



--On Tuesday, June 15, 2004 7:49 +1000 Matthew Sullivan <matthew () sorbs net> wrote:


Owen DeLong wrote:

Until they sign up for Vonage, get hooked on that new multiplayer
realtime
game, discover that they can share music with their friends, or just
want to see what that next killer-app is all about.

Oh, yeah, there's also IRC, YIM, AIM, etc.

Those are just the applications I ran up against when I put a strict
firewall in for my parents (who I regard as being pretty typical of the
we don't know what internet is, but, we want it mom/dad set).

I'm not saying don't permit them at all, I'm saying create a default
account where access is not available, where the customers have to know a
bit about what's going on to make that default blocked account into a
default not blocked account - there gives the ability to force education.
You could also then add extra terms into the equation - as part of the
'non blocked account agreement' the customer has a 'bond' where they get
infected without due dilligence, they loose their bond.... there are
hundreds of ideas, some which will work some which won't - the key point
is most of the ISPs in the USA (but not only them, other countries too)
are doing NOTHING about the problem except saying 'it costs money, whose
going to pay?'... Well why should I pay, when your customers DDoS me?
Why should I pay to keep my email free of spam sent via your customers..?
Why should I pay for firewalls and spend all my time looking for hacking
incidents because you don't want to pay for a little education....?

And I'm saying "who pays for the people to answer the 'My vonage phone
won't work, and Vonage said to get my ISP to fix my broken connection.'
phone calls?"  You and Adi seem to think that everyone should subsidize
this support for the clueless.  For some reason, most ISPs don't think
so, and, neither do I.

And, there's still the question of funding.  Adding simple filters
costs money (labor, if nothing else).  Adding stateful inspection filters
costs more money (same labor, roughly, but, most provider-side routers
don't do stateful inspection, at least not in a scalable way).  The few
that do, usually require additional hardware options (ASPIC, for
example).

Who should pay for that?  I don't think the responsible clueful customers
of an ISP should have to subsidize the clueless, even if the clueless are
the majority.

No you're right, but then the large ISPs should have working abuse desks,
and they should are responsible for traffic originating from their
network.  It's only a matter of time before something will break...  The
way things are going now with infections and exploits, I'm surprised
people are still signing up for the internet, if something is not done
about the problems sooner rather than later I guarentee you the Internet
will go the way of the CB radio.... Noise will drown out the signal,
people will stop using it because it is no longer useable, people who can
afford it will setup on either own private frequency, the noise will
continue until there are just a few die hards left, at which point the
noise will slow and stop because there is no fun in drowning those few
anymore, and all channels will become disused and quiet.....  Then all
those large ISPs out there who say 'filtering costs money why should
we...?' will realise that it's too late to fix the problem, and they will
either diversify or die.

Most ISPs are already diversifying.  However, I don't think your CB analogy
will hold true.  CB Never had any thing truly critical on it.  That's just
not true of the internet.  Too much commerce, government interaction, news,
other societal communications infrastructure is on the internet for people
to abandon it the way CB was.

PS: Owen, this mail is not directed specifically at you, or anyone in
particular, I'm just on my soap box again.

And, likewise, although I mention you and Adi directly, it's not personal.
It's about the issue, not the people involved.

Owen



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