Re: A top-down RPKI model a threat to human freedom? (was Re: Level 3's IRR Database)

[Arturo Servin <arturo.servin () gmail com>]

        Is it really a better alternative? Do we want to pay the cost of a fully distributed RPKI architecture?

        Or do we just abandon the idea of protecting the routing infrastructure?

        There is no free-lunch, we just need to select the price that we want to pay.

-as

On 1 Feb 2011, at 16:29, Benson Schliesser wrote:

> On Feb 1, 2011, at 11:14 AM, Christopher Morrow wrote:
>
> > On Sun, Jan 30, 2011 at 2:55 PM, Martin Millnert <millnert () gmail com> wrote:
> > > Here be dragons,
> > <snip>
> > > It should be fairly obvious, by most recently what's going on in
> > > Egypt, why allowing a government to control the Internet is a Really
> > > Bad Idea.
> >
> > how is the egypt thing related to rPKI?
> > How is the propsed rPKI work related to gov't control?
>
> In theory at least, entities closer to the RPKI root (RIRs, IANA) could invalidate routes for any sort of policy 
> reasons.  This might provide leverage to certain governments, perhaps even offering the ability to control routing 
> beyond their jurisdiction.
>
> As an example, it's imaginable that the US government could require IANA or ARIN to delegate authority to the NSA for 
> a Canadian ISP's routes.  Feel free to replace the RIR/LIR and country names, to suit your own example.
>
> Cheers,
> -Benson