nanog mailing list archives
Re: BGP Security Research Question
From: Nick Hilliard <nick () foobar org>
Date: Tue, 04 Nov 2014 13:00:45 +0000
On 04/11/2014 12:38, sthaug () nethelp no wrote:
These mechanisms do little or nothing to protect against unauthorized origination of routing information. There are plenty of examples which say it has *not* been enough, see for instance the Pakistan Telecom - Youtube incident in 2008.
mis-origination and related problems are all policy problems rather than technical transport issues. Policy implies human input at some stage along the chain, so probably the only way we'll ever see the end of unintended prefix leaks is to completely eliminate human input in all aspects of routing policy management. Nick
Current thread:
- BGP Security Research Question Anthony Weems (Nov 04)
- Re: BGP Security Research Question Roland Dobbins (Nov 04)
- Re: BGP Security Research Question Valdis . Kletnieks (Nov 04)
- Re: BGP Security Research Question Roland Dobbins (Nov 04)
- Re: BGP Security Research Question Valdis . Kletnieks (Nov 04)
- Re: BGP Security Research Question Yuri Slobodyanyuk (Nov 04)
- Re: BGP Security Research Question sthaug (Nov 04)
- Re: BGP Security Research Question Nick Hilliard (Nov 04)
- Re: BGP Security Research Question Sandra Murphy (Nov 04)
- RE: BGP Security Research Question Russ White (Nov 04)
- Re: BGP Security Research Question sthaug (Nov 04)
- Re: BGP Security Research Question Yuri Slobodyanyuk (Nov 04)
- Re: BGP Security Research Question Sandra Murphy (Nov 04)
- Re: BGP Security Research Question sthaug (Nov 04)
- Re: BGP Security Research Question Roland Dobbins (Nov 04)