nanog mailing list archives
Re: BGP Security Research Question
From: Valdis.Kletnieks () vt edu
Date: Tue, 04 Nov 2014 12:17:21 -0500
On Tue, 04 Nov 2014 18:02:47 +0700, "Roland Dobbins" said:
Networks which haven't implemented the BCPs sometimes find their BGP peering sessions disrupted via DDoS attacks against the routers themselves; SYN-floods and the like against TCP/179 are sometimes used to disrupt BGP sessions in such scenarios, for example. Aggressive scanning per the above against BGP speakers which haven't implemented the BCPs could result in inadvertent disruption of BGP sessions.
Am I the only guy wondering how many boxes out there are *still* vulnerable to forged RST packets?
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Current thread:
- BGP Security Research Question Anthony Weems (Nov 04)
- Re: BGP Security Research Question Roland Dobbins (Nov 04)
- Re: BGP Security Research Question Valdis . Kletnieks (Nov 04)
- Re: BGP Security Research Question Roland Dobbins (Nov 04)
- Re: BGP Security Research Question Valdis . Kletnieks (Nov 04)
- Re: BGP Security Research Question Yuri Slobodyanyuk (Nov 04)
- Re: BGP Security Research Question sthaug (Nov 04)
- Re: BGP Security Research Question Nick Hilliard (Nov 04)
- Re: BGP Security Research Question Sandra Murphy (Nov 04)
- RE: BGP Security Research Question Russ White (Nov 04)
- Re: BGP Security Research Question sthaug (Nov 04)
- Re: BGP Security Research Question Yuri Slobodyanyuk (Nov 04)
- Re: BGP Security Research Question Sandra Murphy (Nov 04)
- Re: BGP Security Research Question sthaug (Nov 04)
- Re: BGP Security Research Question Roland Dobbins (Nov 04)