nanog mailing list archives

Re: [External] Re: uPRF strict more


From: Andrew Smith <andrew.william.smith () gmail com>
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 2021 11:13:08 -0500

In Ciscoland, you do have to explicitly state that the default route is
eligible for URPF verification, otherwise you'll get unexpected traffic
drops.

ip verify unicast source reachable-via any allow-default


And yes, it's main purpose is for implementing source-based
remotely-triggered blackhole (SRTBH).

On Thu, Sep 30, 2021 at 10:58 AM Hunter Fuller via NANOG <nanog () nanog org>
wrote:

On Thu, Sep 30, 2021 at 12:08 AM Mark Tinka <mark@tinka.africa> wrote:
If you don't plan to run a full BGP table on a device, don't enable
uRPF, even loose-mode.

At least in Ciscoland, loose URPF checks will pass if you have a
default route. So I do not think it could result in inadvertent
blackholing of traffic.

What it does allow is for *deliberate* blackholing for traffic; if you
null-route a prefix, you now block incoming traffic from that subnet
as well. This can be useful and it is how we are using URPF.


--
Hunter Fuller (they)
Router Jockey
VBH M-1A
+1 256 824 5331

Office of Information Technology
The University of Alabama in Huntsville
Network Engineering


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