nanog mailing list archives

Re: FCC chairwoman: Fines alone aren't enough (Robocalls)


From: sronan () ronan-online com
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 2022 16:42:32 -0400

Inter-telco trunks aren’t all SIP, you might be surprised how much “traditional” trunking there still is.

On Oct 4, 2022, at 3:18 PM, Michael Thomas <mike () mtcc com> wrote:




On 10/4/22 11:58 AM, Tom Beecher wrote:
 Honestly the root of a lot of the problems here is the bellheaded insistence of still using E.164 addresses in the 
first place. With SIP they are complete legacy and there is no reason that my "telephone number" can't be mike () 
mtcc com.

You can do that all you want. You just don't get to interact with the PSTN.
What is the "PSTN" these days? It's a bunch of interconnected SIP proxies where there is nothing special about the 
identifiers used. With end to end SIP (or middle to middle, etc), the routing is not being done with e.164 addresses 
like in the legacy PSTN. It's just bellheaded thinking that e.164 addresses mean anything these days.The only time 
they make any difference is if they need to off ramp to legacy signaling which is becoming rarer and rarer. 

Mike




On Tue, Oct 4, 2022 at 2:53 PM Michael Thomas <mike () mtcc com> wrote:

On 10/4/22 11:31 AM, Mike Hammett wrote:
What's regulated or implemented is rarely the best course of action. Does this cause more good or harm?

Honestly the root of a lot of the problems here is the bellheaded insistence of still using E.164 addresses in the 
first place. With SIP they are complete legacy and there is no reason that my "telephone number" can't be mike () 
mtcc com. In fact, that would be a huge win since I could just use my email address book to make a call. You could 
tell that STIR/SHAKEN really went off the rails when it has heuristics on how to scrape E.164 addresses in the 
From: field. At this point we should be mostly ignoring legacy signaling, IMO. 



Mike




-----
Mike Hammett
Intelligent Computing Solutions
http://www.ics-il.com

Midwest-IX
http://www.midwest-ix.com

From: "Shane Ronan" <shane () ronan-online com>
To: "Michael Thomas" <mike () mtcc com>
Cc: "Mike Hammett" <nanog () ics-il net>, nanog () nanog org
Sent: Tuesday, October 4, 2022 1:21:41 PM
Subject: Re: FCC chairwoman: Fines alone aren't enough (Robocalls)

Except the cost to do the data dips to determine the authorization isn't "free".

On Tue, Oct 4, 2022 at 2:18 PM Michael Thomas <mike () mtcc com> wrote:

On 10/4/22 6:07 AM, Mike Hammett wrote:
I think the point the other Mike was trying to make was that if everyone policed their customers, this wouldn't 
be a problem. Since some don't, something else needed to be tried.


Exactly. And that doesn't require an elaborate PKI. Who is allowed to use what telephone numbers is an 
administrative issue for the ingress provider to police. It's the equivalent to gmail not allowing me to spoof 
whatever email address I want. The FCC could have required that ages ago.



Mike


-----
Mike Hammett
Intelligent Computing Solutions
http://www.ics-il.com

Midwest-IX
http://www.midwest-ix.com

From: "Shane Ronan" <shane () ronan-online com>
To: "Michael Thomas" <mike () mtcc com>
Cc: nanog () nanog org
Sent: Monday, October 3, 2022 9:54:07 PM
Subject: Re: FCC chairwoman: Fines alone aren't enough (Robocalls)

The issue isn't which 'prefixes' I accept from my customers, but which 'prefixes' I accept from the people I peer 
with, because it's entirely dynamic and without a doing a database dip on EVERY call, I have to assume that my 
peer or my peers customer or my peers peer is doing the right thing.

I can't simply block traffic from a peer carrier, it's not allowed, so there has to be some mechanism to mark 
that a prefix should be allowed, which is what Shaken/Stir does.

Shane



On Mon, Oct 3, 2022 at 7:05 PM Michael Thomas <mike () mtcc com> wrote:
The problem has always been solvable at the ingress provider. The 
problem was that there was zero to negative incentive to do that. You 
don't need an elaborate PKI to tell the ingress provider which prefixes 
customers are allow to assert. It's pretty analogous to when submission 
authentication was pretty nonexistent with email... there was no 
incentive to not be an open relay sewer. Unlike email spam, SIP 
signaling is pretty easy to determine whether it's spam. All it needed 
was somebody to force regulation which unlike email there was always 
jurisdiction with the FCC.

Mike

On 10/3/22 3:13 PM, Jawaid Bazyar wrote:
We're talking about blocking other carriers.

On 10/3/22, 3:05 PM, "Michael Thomas" <mike () mtcc com> wrote:

     On 10/3/22 1:54 PM, Jawaid Bazyar wrote:
     > Because it's illegal for common carriers to block traffic otherwise.

     Wait, what? It's illegal to police their own users?

     Mike

     >
     > On 10/3/22, 2:53 PM, "NANOG on behalf of Michael Thomas" <nanog-bounces+jbazyar=verobroadband.com () 
nanog org on behalf of mike () mtcc com> wrote:
     >
     >
     >      On 10/3/22 1:34 PM, Sean Donelan wrote:
     >      > 'Fines alone aren't enough:' FCC threatens to blacklist voice
     >      > providers for flouting robocall rules
     >      >
     >      > https://www.cyberscoop.com/fcc-robocall-fine-database-removal/
     >      >
     >      > [...]
     >      > “This is a new era. If a provider doesn’t meet its obligations under
     >      > the law, it now faces expulsion from America’s phone networks. Fines
     >      > alone aren’t enough,” FCC chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel said in a
     >      > statement accompanying the announcement. “Providers that don’t follow
     >      > our rules and make it easy to scam consumers will now face swift
     >      > consequences.”
     >      >
     >      > It’s the first such enforcement action by the agency to reduce the
     >      > growing problem of robocalls since call ID verification protocols
     >      > known as “STIR/SHAKEN” went fully into effect this summer.
     >      > [...]
     >
     >      Why did we need to wait for STIR/SHAKEN to do this?
     >
     >      Mike
     >





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