nanog mailing list archives

Re: FCC chairwoman: Fines alone aren't enough (Robocalls)


From: Michael Thomas <mike () mtcc com>
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 2022 13:50:18 -0700


On 10/4/22 1:40 PM, sronan () ronan-online com wrote:
Except the pstn DB isn’t distributed like DNS is.


Yes, I had forgot about "dip" in that sense. But an originating provider doesn't need to do a dip to know that the calling number routes to itself. I've been talking about the calling provider not the called provider all along.

Mike


On Oct 4, 2022, at 2:40 PM, Michael Thomas <mike () mtcc com> wrote:




On 10/4/22 11:21 AM, Shane Ronan wrote:
Except the cost to do the data dips to determine the authorization isn't "free".

Since every http request in the universe requires a "database dip" and they are probably a billion times more common, that doesn't seem like a very compelling concern.

Mike



On Tue, Oct 4, 2022 at 2:18 PM Michael Thomas <mike () mtcc com> wrote:


    On 10/4/22 6:07 AM, Mike Hammett wrote:
    I think the point the other Mike was trying to make was that if
    everyone policed their customers, this wouldn't be a problem.
    Since some don't, something else needed to be tried.


    Exactly. And that doesn't require an elaborate PKI. Who is
    allowed to use what telephone numbers is an administrative issue
    for the ingress provider to police. It's the equivalent to gmail
    not allowing me to spoof whatever email address I want. The FCC
    could have required that ages ago.


    Mike


    -----
    Mike Hammett
    Intelligent Computing Solutions
    http://www.ics-il.com

    Midwest-IX
    http://www.midwest-ix.com

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    *From: *"Shane Ronan" <shane () ronan-online com>
    <mailto:shane () ronan-online com>
    *To: *"Michael Thomas" <mike () mtcc com> <mailto:mike () mtcc com>
    *Cc: *nanog () nanog org
    *Sent: *Monday, October 3, 2022 9:54:07 PM
    *Subject: *Re: FCC chairwoman: Fines alone aren't enough
    (Robocalls)

    The issue isn't which 'prefixes' I accept from my customers,
    but which 'prefixes' I accept from the people I peer with,
    because it's entirely dynamic and without a doing a database
    dip on EVERY call, I have to assume that my peer or my peers
    customer or my peers peer is doing the right thing.

    I can't simply block traffic from a peer carrier, it's not
    allowed, so there has to be some mechanism to mark that a
    prefix should be allowed, which is what Shaken/Stir does.

    Shane



    On Mon, Oct 3, 2022 at 7:05 PM Michael Thomas <mike () mtcc com>
    wrote:

        The problem has always been solvable at the ingress
        provider. The
        problem was that there was zero to negative incentive to do
        that. You
        don't need an elaborate PKI to tell the ingress provider
        which prefixes
        customers are allow to assert. It's pretty analogous to
        when submission
        authentication was pretty nonexistent with email... there
        was no
        incentive to not be an open relay sewer. Unlike email spam,
        SIP
        signaling is pretty easy to determine whether it's spam.
        All it needed
        was somebody to force regulation which unlike email there
        was always
        jurisdiction with the FCC.

        Mike

        On 10/3/22 3:13 PM, Jawaid Bazyar wrote:
        > We're talking about blocking other carriers.
        >
        > On 10/3/22, 3:05 PM, "Michael Thomas" <mike () mtcc com> wrote:
        >
        >      On 10/3/22 1:54 PM, Jawaid Bazyar wrote:
        >      > Because it's illegal for common carriers to block
        traffic otherwise.
        >
        >      Wait, what? It's illegal to police their own users?
        >
        >      Mike
        >
        >      >
        >      > On 10/3/22, 2:53 PM, "NANOG on behalf of Michael
        Thomas" <nanog-bounces+jbazyar=verobroadband.com () nanog org
        on behalf of mike () mtcc com> wrote:
        >      >
        >      >
        >      >      On 10/3/22 1:34 PM, Sean Donelan wrote:
        >      >      > 'Fines alone aren't enough:' FCC threatens
        to blacklist voice
        >      >      > providers for flouting robocall rules
        >      >      >
        >      >      >
        https://www.cyberscoop.com/fcc-robocall-fine-database-removal/
        >      >      >
        >      >      > [...]
        >      >      > “This is a new era. If a provider doesn’t
        meet its obligations under
        >      >      > the law, it now faces expulsion from
        America’s phone networks. Fines
        >      >      > alone aren’t enough,” FCC chairwoman
        Jessica Rosenworcel said in a
        >      >      > statement accompanying the announcement.
        “Providers that don’t follow
        >      >      > our rules and make it easy to scam
        consumers will now face swift
        >      >      > consequences.”
        >      >      >
        >      >      > It’s the first such enforcement action by
        the agency to reduce the
        >      >      > growing problem of robocalls since call ID
        verification protocols
        >      >      > known as “STIR/SHAKEN” went fully into
        effect this summer.
        >      >      > [...]
        >      >
        >      >      Why did we need to wait for STIR/SHAKEN to do
        this?
        >      >
        >      >      Mike
        >      >
        >
        >


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