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Re: Re: backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to ssh server compromise


From: Jakub Wilk <jwilk () jwilk net>
Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2024 18:37:44 +0200

* Jonathan Schleifer <js () nil im>, 2024-03-30 17:17:
I replaced the sed in here:

sed \"r\n\" $gl_am_configmake | eval $gl_path_map | $gl_localedir_prefix -d 2>/dev/null

With a simple cat, as I could not make sed work. This worries me as it means there is probably some other transformation that I'm missing that would have made the sed work.

It's confusing because there are two layers of eval involved. You actually end up running:

  sed rn ...

The "r" command means "read from file"; but there's no file named "n", so this is no-op.

The sed command is not completely equivalent to cat though: it appends a newline, because the original file didn't end with one. This trailing garbage slightly upsets xz(1):

    xz: (stdin): Unexpected end of input

(You normally wouldn't see this warning, thanks to generous use of "2>/dev/null" in build-to-host.m4.)

--
Jakub Wilk


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