Re: [PEN-TEST] Palm Pilot Security

[Crist Clark <crist.clark () GLOBALSTAR COM>]

Mike Ahern wrote:

[snip]

> Anybody aware of methods to hack past the password
> protection on the Palm? I assume that like anything
> else, physical access equals potential for 100% system
> compromise. Anyone aware of any RSA/Security Dynamics
> soft token security issues on the Palm Pilot?

I believe what is important in this case is not necessarily preventing
people from breaking the password protection, but rather being able
to detect it.

Most SecurID tokens have no access control. It's just a little device
with a number on the screen. If the user loses it or it is stolen, you
deactivate access for the old one and give him a new one. It is assumed
it cannot be cloned without the owner noticing. Even if one can crack it
open to get the secret key out, the owner should be able to tell the
device was tampered with.

For a PDA with soft tolken software, the problem is that it may be
possible for an attacker to clone the tolken without the owner knowing.
Like you say, one assumes physical access equals compromise. If someone
loses her PDA, you cancel access for her tolken. Easy call. The challenge
in arrises when a tolken is stolen, but the physical device is not. It
is not required that the password protection on the PDA be extremely
strong or difficult to defeat _PROVIDED_ you can tell when this has
occurred.

That said, I really do not know how easy or difficult it is to compromise
a PDA and then cover your tracks. I just wanted to point out that if some
people point to general information about PDA security, this should probably
be the criteria used to evaluate their security standards when serving as
a soft tolken device: Not the ability to repell attack, but the ability
to tell if an attack has occurred.
--
Crist J. Clark                                Network Security Engineer
crist.clark () globalstar com                    Globalstar, L.P.