Penetration Testing mailing list archives
Re: [PEN-TEST] Palm Pilot Security
From: "Ng, Kenneth (US)" <kenng () KPMG COM>
Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2001 10:29:24 -0500
SecurID authentication depends on two components, what you have and what you know. To defeat a hardware token you must generate the proper code at the proper time, and you must know the PIN that the person has chosen. PINs are from 3 to 8 character alpha numerics, but I bet most people choose 4 digit numbers to match their ATM card. As far as getting information from a PALM pilot, I'd imagine that you would have to borrow the pilot twice. The first time put in a program to copy the PIN. The second time to get the PIN and download the seed information. Technically you should also get the time on the pilot with respect to UTC, but most equipment should be within a minute or two of the real time. Stealing a pilot often isn't hard. Borrowing one that is returned without the person noticing is usually harder. I have no idea how long it would take to break in and add a PIN grabbing program. Summary: is it an increased risk? Yes. Is it significant? Well, depends on how well the end user guards his pilot. I keep mine in my pocket except at home. I never leave it on my desk at work. -----Original Message----- From: Crist Clark [mailto:crist.clark () GLOBALSTAR COM] Sent: Thursday, January 25, 2001 7:27 PM To: PEN-TEST () SECURITYFOCUS COM Subject: Re: [PEN-TEST] Palm Pilot Security Mike Ahern wrote: [snip]
Anybody aware of methods to hack past the password protection on the Palm? I assume that like anything else, physical access equals potential for 100% system compromise. Anyone aware of any RSA/Security Dynamics soft token security issues on the Palm Pilot?
I believe what is important in this case is not necessarily preventing people from breaking the password protection, but rather being able to detect it. Most SecurID tokens have no access control. It's just a little device with a number on the screen. If the user loses it or it is stolen, you deactivate access for the old one and give him a new one. It is assumed it cannot be cloned without the owner noticing. Even if one can crack it open to get the secret key out, the owner should be able to tell the device was tampered with. For a PDA with soft tolken software, the problem is that it may be possible for an attacker to clone the tolken without the owner knowing. Like you say, one assumes physical access equals compromise. If someone loses her PDA, you cancel access for her tolken. Easy call. The challenge in arrises when a tolken is stolen, but the physical device is not. It is not required that the password protection on the PDA be extremely strong or difficult to defeat _PROVIDED_ you can tell when this has occurred. That said, I really do not know how easy or difficult it is to compromise a PDA and then cover your tracks. I just wanted to point out that if some people point to general information about PDA security, this should probably be the criteria used to evaluate their security standards when serving as a soft tolken device: Not the ability to repell attack, but the ability to tell if an attack has occurred. -- Crist J. Clark Network Security Engineer crist.clark () globalstar com Globalstar, L.P. ***************************************************************************** The information in this email is confidential and may be legally privileged. It is intended solely for the addressee. Access to this email by anyone else is unauthorized. If you are not the intended recipient, any disclosure, copying, distribution or any action taken or omitted to be taken in reliance on it, is prohibited and may be unlawful. When addressed to our clients any opinions or advice contained in this email are subject to the terms and conditions expressed in the governing KPMG client engagement letter. *****************************************************************************
Current thread:
- [PEN-TEST] Palm Pilot Security Mike Ahern (Jan 25)
- Re: [PEN-TEST] Palm Pilot Security Crist Clark (Jan 25)
- Re: [PEN-TEST] Palm Pilot Security Rory (Jan 25)
- Re: [PEN-TEST] Palm Pilot Security Aviram Jenik (Jan 29)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- Re: [PEN-TEST] Palm Pilot Security Mitch James (Jan 25)
- Re: [PEN-TEST] Palm Pilot Security Ng, Kenneth (US) (Jan 29)
- Re: [PEN-TEST] Palm Pilot Security Wall, Kevin (Jan 29)
- Re: [PEN-TEST] Palm Pilot Security sporty o'one (Jan 29)
- Re: [PEN-TEST] Palm Pilot Security Scott Treacy (Jan 29)
- Re: [PEN-TEST] Palm Pilot Security Walsh, John (Jan 29)
- Re: [PEN-TEST] Palm Pilot Security DK (Jan 29)
- Message not available
- [PEN-TEST] BIND 8 - TSIG Bug Exploit Jason Witty (Jan 29)