Penetration Testing mailing list archives

Re: Raptor Firewall 6.5 Config


From: Mike Shaw <mshaw () wwisp com>
Date: Tue, 08 Jan 2002 11:12:28 -0600

I worked with raptor for several years, and what you are observing are the infamous "Raptor false positives".

It's been few months since I worked with a Raptor box, but my understanding is this. Once raptor has a standard proxy or GSP enabled, it 'opens' that port on all interfaces. It allows you to make the connection to the outside interface, and then uses the rules to allow or deny the subsequent proxied connection. Thus, you can 'connect' to all those ports, but you won't actually connect to the host unless there is a rule allowing it.

So the only real danger is if they have misconfigured their rules. If they put an "http universe - universe" rule in there, then yes--you'll be able to hit any box on the inside. However, if they have a well designed ruleset you will only be able to hit the boxes they've explicitly allowed. And if they've done it *right*, you will only be able to initiate connections from the outside (thereby eliminating any shoveled prompts, mailed pwdump output, etc).

However, the fact that they have not patched the firewall indicates a high probability of over-permissive rules.

Another thing to watch out for. If they used a GSP (generic proxy) on those high ports (7070, 8080, etc) instead of the regular HTTP proxies, then you can do things that the normal HTTP proxy would have blocked. I *think* this is true for FTP too if they used a redirection instead of the normal proxy method (normal being log in to the outside interface then use username@hostname to be forwarded).

It's no fun for an auditor/pen-tester, because a plain ol' port scan won't give you the intelligence you're looking for. Instead, you have to look through manually or do some creative scripting. On the other hand, you can instantly tell certain things, since an open port other than the default list means a rule from 'somewhere to somewhere' which probably wouldn't be there unless it's in use. For instance, you know they are using PCAnywhere and MSSQL. That's something you may or may not have known before.

Remember too that they can do port redirection, so even if you do see a particular service running on all hosts, that could mean that they've redirected several or all IP:ports to a single internal box.

-Mike

At 02:37 AM 1/8/2002 +0000, Josh wrote:


Hello,

I am conducting a blind penetration test for a client
and have identified the firewall to be Raptor 6.5. It
appears to be loosely configured as the Raptor HTTP
proxy server vulnerability
(http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/2517) exists, and I
can reach internal addresses, etc.

The port scan on the network revealed that many
TCP ports were open on the firewall and on the hosts
behind it. What seems strange to me is that the
results of the nmap scan show the same ports open
for every "active" host identified behind the Raptor.

Is it possible that Raptor is talking to nmap and
opening ports based on a single ruleset for any host
behind the firewall? I can confirm that the hosts are
separate machines using other techniques. For
example, I don't see why the Raptor has port
1433/TCP open for the Solaris machine I can see in
addition to several NT 4.0 hosts that might be running
MS SQL Server.

The nmap scan shows the following ports open for
ANY host that I can ping or confirm as being alive and
behind the Raptor:

Port       State       Service (RPC)
21/tcp     open        ftp
23/tcp     open        telnet
25/tcp     open        smtp
70/tcp     open        gopher
80/tcp     open        http
110/tcp    open        pop-3
119/tcp    open        nntp
139/tcp    open        netbios-ssn
443/tcp    open        https
444/tcp    open        snpp
445/tcp    open        microsoft-ds
512/tcp    open        exec
513/tcp    open        login
514/tcp    open        shell
554/tcp    open        rtsp
1433/tcp   open        ms-sql-s
1720/tcp   open        unknown
5631/tcp   open        pcanywheredata
7070/tcp   open        unknown
8080/tcp   open        http-proxy
8181/tcp   open        unknown

Can anyone with Raptor 6.5 experience speak to
this? Does this match up to some default
configuration for 6.5?

It seems to me that the firewall is misconfigured. For
example, a developer could put a vanilla install of IIS 4
on one of my client's NT machines and unknowlingly
open up the whole network to attack since port 80 is
opened by Raptor for the host even though it isn't
currently running an HTTP service.

Josh <josh () sway org>


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This list is provided by the SecurityFocus Security Intelligence Alert (SIA)
Service. For more information on SecurityFocus' SIA service which
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https://alerts.securityfocus.com/


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