Re: Raptor Firewall 6.5 Config

["Johann van Duyn" <Johann_van_Duyn () bat com>]

Amen to Mike's response.

A pen-tester normally smiles very broadly when first portscanning a network
protected by a Raptor box, but often ends up pulling his/her hair out when
they are unable to actually do anything with the results from the scans...

I used to look after a site that sat behind a Raptor box, and would get
calls from security companies wanting our business and offering to do a
free 'light test' of our network, basically rattling our doors. They would
often claim that they found numerous ports open, but when I challenged them
to do something with those ports, they went away. I loved it. :-)

Sloppy patching procedures do not necessarily reflect on the quality of the
ruleset. If the Raptor ruleset is any good, you'll have your work cut out
actually exploiting anything on the inside of the network you're testing,
outside of what the unpatched HTTP proxy server vulnerability lets you do.

Cheers

-----------------------------------------
Johann van Duyn, CISSP
E:mail: johann_van_duyn () bat com
-----------------------------------------
"We see things as we are, not as they are." -- Leon Rosten



|------------------------+------------------------>
|                        |   Mike Shaw            |
|                        |   <mshaw () wwisp com>    |
|                        |                        |
|                        |   2002/01/08 19:12     |
|                        |                        |
|------------------------+------------------------>
  >------------------------|
  |                        |
  |           To:          |
  |   Josh <josh () sway org>,|
  |   pen-test@securityfocu|
  |   s.com                |
  |           cc:          |
  |   (bcc: Johann van     |
  |   Duyn/Stellenbosch/ZA/|
  |   BATCo)               |
  |           Subject:     |
  |   Re: Raptor Firewall  |
  |   6.5 Config           |
  >------------------------|






[IMAGE]
I worked with raptor for several years, and what you are observing are the
infamous "Raptor false positives".

It's been few months since I worked with a Raptor box, but my understanding
is this.  Once raptor has a standard proxy or GSP enabled, it 'opens' that
port on all interfaces.  It allows you to make the connection to the
outside interface, and then uses the rules to allow or deny the subsequent
proxied connection.  Thus, you can 'connect' to all those ports, but you
won't actually connect to the host unless there is a rule allowing it.

So the only real danger is if they have misconfigured their rules.  If they
put an "http universe - universe" rule in there, then yes--you'll be able
to hit any box on the inside.  However, if they have a well designed
ruleset you will only be able to hit the boxes they've explicitly
allowed.  And if they've done it *right*, you will only be able to initiate
connections from the outside (thereby eliminating any shoveled prompts,
mailed pwdump output, etc).

However, the fact that they have not patched the firewall indicates a high
probability of over-permissive rules.

Another thing to watch out for.  If they used a GSP (generic proxy) on
those high ports (7070, 8080, etc) instead of the regular HTTP proxies,
then you can do things that the normal HTTP proxy would have blocked.  I
*think* this is true for FTP too if they used a redirection instead of the
normal proxy method (normal being log in to the outside interface then use
username@hostname to be forwarded).

It's no fun for an auditor/pen-tester, because a plain ol' port scan won't
give you the intelligence you're looking for.  Instead, you have to look
through manually or do some creative scripting.  On the other hand, you can
instantly tell certain things, since an open port other than the default
list means a rule from 'somewhere to somewhere' which probably wouldn't be
there unless it's in use.  For instance, you know they are using PCAnywhere
and MSSQL.  That's something you may or may not have known before.

Remember too that they can do port redirection, so even if you do see a
particular service running on all hosts, that could mean that they've
redirected several or all IP:ports to a single internal box.

-Mike

At 02:37 AM 1/8/2002 +0000, Josh wrote:


> Hello,
>
> I am conducting a blind penetration test for a client
> and have identified the firewall to be Raptor 6.5. It
> appears to be loosely configured as the Raptor HTTP
> proxy server vulnerability
> (http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/2517) exists, and I
> can reach internal addresses, etc.
>
> The port scan on the network revealed that many
> TCP ports were open on the firewall and on the hosts
> behind it. What seems strange to me is that the
> results of the nmap scan show the same ports open
> for every "active" host identified behind the Raptor.
>
> Is it possible that Raptor is talking to nmap and
> opening ports based on a single ruleset for any host
> behind the firewall? I can confirm that the hosts are
> separate machines using other techniques. For
> example, I don't see why the Raptor has port
> 1433/TCP open for the Solaris machine I can see in
> addition to several NT 4.0 hosts that might be running
> MS SQL Server.
>
> The nmap scan shows the following ports open for
> ANY host that I can ping or confirm as being alive and
> behind the Raptor:
>
> Port       State       Service (RPC)
> 21/tcp     open        ftp
> 23/tcp     open        telnet
> 25/tcp     open        smtp
> 70/tcp     open        gopher
> 80/tcp     open        http
> 110/tcp    open        pop-3
> 119/tcp    open        nntp
> 139/tcp    open        netbios-ssn
> 443/tcp    open        https
> 444/tcp    open        snpp
> 445/tcp    open        microsoft-ds
> 512/tcp    open        exec
> 513/tcp    open        login
> 514/tcp    open        shell
> 554/tcp    open        rtsp
> 1433/tcp   open        ms-sql-s
> 1720/tcp   open        unknown
> 5631/tcp   open        pcanywheredata
> 7070/tcp   open        unknown
> 8080/tcp   open        http-proxy
> 8181/tcp   open        unknown
>
> Can anyone with Raptor 6.5 experience speak to
> this? Does this match up to some default
> configuration for 6.5?
>
> It seems to me that the firewall is misconfigured. For
> example, a developer could put a vanilla install of IIS 4
> on one of my client's NT machines and unknowlingly
> open up the whole network to attack since port 80 is
> opened by Raptor for the host even though it isn't
> currently running an HTTP service.
>
> Josh <josh () sway org>
>
>
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------
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