Re: [Full-disclosure] Re: [Owasp-dotnet] RE: 4 Questions: Latest IEvulnerability, Firefox vs IE security, User vs Admin risk profile,and browsers coded in 100% Managed Verifiable code

["Joe Ciechanowski" <joe () innismaggiore com>]

What do you guys think about these products for "secure" browsing / internet 
use?

http://www.download.com/3120-20_4-0.html?tag=srch&qt=bufferzone&tg=dl-20&search.x=0&search.y=0&search=+Go%21

I'm hesitant to install on my dev machine because I'm not sure it will play 
nice with VS 2005.
Anybody use these products? Thanks for your input.

Joe Ciechanowski
Sr.Web Developer
InnisMaggiore
4715 Whipple Ave.
Canton, Ohio 44718
(330) 492-5500


----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Dinis Cruz" <dinis () ddplus net>
To: <jeff.williams () owasp org>
Cc: <webappsec () securityfocus com>; <SC-L () securecoding org>; 
<full-disclosure () lists grok org uk>; <owasp-leaders () lists sourceforge net>; 
<owasp-dotnet () lists sourceforge net>; <xforce () iss net>
Sent: Sunday, March 26, 2006 9:22 PM
Subject: [Full-disclosure] Re: [Owasp-dotnet] RE: 4 Questions: Latest IE 
vulnerability, Firefox vs IE security, User vs Admin risk profile, and 
browsers coded in 100% Managed Verifiable code


> Hi Jeff, comments inline
>
> Jeff Williams wrote:
> > Great topics.
> >
> > I'm a huge fan of sandboxes, but Dinis is right, the market hasn't really
> > gotten there yet. No question that it would help if it was possible to 
> > run
> > complex software like a browser inside a sandbox that restricted its 
> > ability
> > to do bad things, even if there are vulnerabilities (or worse --  
> > malicious
> > code) in them.
> Absolutely, and do you see any other alternative? (or we should just
> continue to TRUST every bit of code that is executed in our computers?
> and TRUST every single developer/entity that had access to that code
> during its development and deployment?)
> >  I'm terrified about the epidemic use of libraries that are
> > just downloaded from wherever (in both client and server applications). 
> > All
> > that code can do *whatever* it wants in your environments folks!
> Yes they can, and one of my original questions was 'When considering the
> assets, is there REALLY any major differences between running code as
> normal user versus as an administrator?"
> > Sandboxes are finally making some headway. Most of the Java application
> > servers (Tomcat included) now run with their sandbox enabled (albeit with 
> > a
> > weak policy). And I think the Java Web Start system also has the sandbox
> > enabled.  So maybe we're making progress.
> True, but are these really secure sandboxes?
>
> I am not a Java expert so I can't give you specific examples, but on the
> .Net Framework a Partially Trusted 'Sandbox' which contains an
> UnamanagedCode, MemberAccess Reflection or SkipVerification Permission,
> should not be called a 'Sandbox' since it can be easily compromised.
> > But, if you've ever tried to configure the Java security policy file, use
> > JAAS, or implement the SecurityManager interface, you know that it's 
> > *way*
> > too hard to implement a tight policy this way.
> And .Net has exactly the same problem. It is super complex to create a
> .Net application that can be executed in a secure Partially Trusted 
> Sandbox.
> >   You end up granting all
> > kinds of privileges because it's too difficult to do it right.
> And the new VS2005 makes this allocation of privileges very easy: "Mr.
> developer, your application crashed because it didn't have the required
> permissions, Do you want to add these permissions, Yes No? ....
> (developer clicks yes) ... "You are adding the permission
> UnamanagedCodePermission, do you sure, Yes No? ... (developer clicks yes
> (with support from application architect and confident that all
> competitor Applications require similar permissions))"
> > And only the
> > developer of the software could reasonably attempt it, which is 
> > backwards,
> > because it's the *user* who really needs it right.
> Yes, it is the user's responsibility (i.e. its IT Security and Server
> Admin staff) to define the secure environment (i.e the Sandbox) that 3rd
> party or internal-developed applications are allocated inside their data
> center,
>
> > It's possible that sandboxes are going the way of multilevel security 
> > (MLS).
> > A sort of ivory tower idea that's too complex to implement or use.
> I don't agree that the problem is too complex. What we have today is
> very complex architectures / systems with too many interconnections.
>
> Simplify the lot, get enough resources with the correct focus involved,
> are you will see that it is doable.
> > But it
> > seems like a really good idea that we should try to make practical. But 
> > even
> > if they do start getting used, we can't just give up on getting software
> > developers to produce secure code.  There will always be security 
> > problems
> > that sandboxes designed for the platform cannot help with.
> Of course, I am not saying that developers should produce insecure code,
> I am the first to defend that developers must have a firm and solid
> understanding of the tools and technologies  that they use, and also as
> important, the security implications of their code.
> > I'm with Dinis that the only way to get people to care is to fix the
> > externalities in the software market and put the burden on those who can
> > most easily avoid the costs -- the people who build the software. Maybe 
> > then
> > the business case will be more clear.
> Yes, but the key here is not with money (since that would also kill
> large chunks of the Open Source world).
>
> One of the solutions that I like, is the situation where all software
> companies have (by law) to disclose information about the
> vulnerabilities that they are aware of (look at the Eeye model of
> disclosing information about 'reported but unpatched vulnerabilities').
>
> Basically, give the user data (as in information) that he can digest and
> understand, and you will see the user(s) making the correct decision(s).
> > (Your last point about non-verified MSIL is terrifying. I can't think of 
> > any
> > reason why you would want to turn off verification -- except perhaps 
> > startup
> > speed. But that's a terrible tradeoff.)
> See my previous post (on this same thread) about this issue, but I think
> that .Net is not alone in skipping verification for locally executed code 
> :)
>
> Dinis Cruz
> Owasp .Net Project
> www.owasp.net
>
>
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