IDS mailing list archives
Re: Cisco CTR
From: "Joe Bowling" <joebowling () comcast net>
Date: Sat, 8 Nov 2003 01:06:21 -0500
You will love the new RNA technology that sourcefire is coming out with in December think a solution
would be for the IDS to keep a record of the patch levels of every system
in
the network and allow those patch levels to be updated only through an administrative interface (requiring additional authentication and of
course
increasing the administrative workload). Then the system wouldn't be
fooled
by this technique.
----- Original Message ----- From: "Michael Marziani" <marziani () oasis com> To: "Rob Shein" <shoten () starpower net>; "'Gary Flynn'" <flynngn () jmu edu> Cc: "'Liran Chen'" <liranil () optonline net>; <focus-ids () securityfocus com> Sent: Friday, November 07, 2003 10:47 AM Subject: RE: Cisco CTR
-----Original Message----- From: Rob Shein [mailto:shoten () starpower net] Yes, but nobody patches it THAT quickly. CTR acts immediately, not a half-hour later...it would have started scanning by the time the hacker
at
the other end notices that he has a shell...Please don't make unsubstantiated blanket statements like that. Hackers
are
skilled sysadmins and programmers who create packaged hacking tools that
not
only search for and exploit flaws to get them onto a system, but also install programs, disable security features, and yes, patch servers *immediately* once they get inside. A system like Cisco CTR might very well detect the attack before the hacker's program has time to patch, but that all depends on how good the hacker's program is, the state of the network, etc. I'd like to see the results of a live test of such an event. If this type of attack can succeed as I think it could, I think a solution would be for the IDS to keep a record of the patch levels of every system
in
the network and allow those patch levels to be updated only through an administrative interface (requiring additional authentication and of
course
increasing the administrative workload). Then the system wouldn't be
fooled
by this technique. -Michael Michael Marziani IT Consultant Entercede Consulting, Inc.-----Original Message----- From: Gary Flynn [mailto:flynngn () jmu edu] Sent: Thursday, November 06, 2003 5:58 PM To: Rob Shein Cc: 'Liran Chen'; focus-ids () securityfocus com Subject: Re: Cisco CTR Rob Shein wrote:I think this largely relates to the earlier discussionabout how thereis a difference between a "false positive" and an actualattack thatfails to succeed. Ask yourself this: are you going to want to know about all attacks or just those that have a chance of success? If someone throws IIS attacks at your apache web server, doyou want toknow about it...or do you want to wait until they start using apache-compatible exploits? There's a good summary of what CTR does here: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/secursw/ps5054/Another thing to think about - some folks have a habit of patching the hole they came in through. Just because a vulnerability scan shows no vulnerability it does not mean an attack was unsuccessful. -- Gary Flynn Security Engineer - Technical Services James Madison University Please R.U.N.S.A.F.E. http://www.jmu.edu/computing/runsafe------------------------------------------------------------------ --------- Network with over 10,000 of the brightest minds in information security at the largest, most highly-anticipated industry event of the year. Don't miss RSA Conference 2004! Choose from over 200 class sessions and see demos from more than 250 industry vendors. If your job touches security, you need to be here. Learn more or register at http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/RSA_focus-ids_031023 and use priority code SF4. ------------------------------------------------------------------ -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Network with over 10,000 of the brightest minds in information security at the largest, most highly-anticipated industry event of the year. Don't miss RSA Conference 2004! Choose from over 200 class sessions and see demos from more than 250 industry vendors. If your job touches security, you need to be here. Learn more or register at http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/RSA_focus-ids_031023 and use priority code SF4. --------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- Network with over 10,000 of the brightest minds in information security at the largest, most highly-anticipated industry event of the year. Don't miss RSA Conference 2004! Choose from over 200 class sessions and see demos from more than 250 industry vendors. If your job touches security, you need to be here. Learn more or register at http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/RSA_focus-ids_031023 and use priority code SF4. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current thread:
- Re: Cisco CTR, (continued)
- Re: Cisco CTR Gary Flynn (Nov 07)
- RE: Cisco CTR Rob Shein (Nov 07)
- RE: Cisco CTR Michael Marziani (Nov 07)
- RE: Cisco CTR Rob Shein (Nov 07)
- RE: Cisco CTR Michael Marziani (Nov 07)
- RE: Cisco CTR Rob Shein (Nov 07)
- Re: Cisco CTR Renaud Deraison (Nov 10)
- Re: Cisco CTR Gary Flynn (Nov 07)
- RE: Cisco CTR Gary Halleen (Nov 07)
- RE: Cisco CTR Michael Marziani (Nov 10)
- RE: Cisco CTR Chad R. Skipper (Nov 10)
- Re: Cisco CTR Joe Bowling (Nov 10)
- RE: Cisco CTR Alan Shimel (Nov 10)
- Re: Cisco CTR John Lampe (Nov 10)
- Re: Cisco CTR Joe Bowling (Nov 12)
- Re: Cisco CTR Ron Gula (Nov 13)
- Re: Cisco CTR John Lampe (Nov 13)
- Re: Cisco CTR Martin Roesch (Nov 17)