Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics

["Neil J. McRae" <neil () domino org>]

maybe volunteers from the nanog community should contact you?

On 4 Sep 2011, at 16:45, "Jennifer Rexford" <jrex () CS Princeton EDU> wrote:

> Neil,
>
> The group is being assembled right now, so we don't have a list as of yet. 
>
> -- Jen
>
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
> On Sep 4, 2011, at 11:32 AM, "Neil J. McRae" <neil () domino org> wrote:
>
> > Jen,
> > What operators are involved? And who represents them specifically?
> >
> > Neil.
> >
> > On 04/09/2011 16:07, "Jennifer Rexford" <jrex () CS Princeton EDU> wrote:
> > > As one of the co-chairs of this working group, I'd like to chime in to
> > > clarify the purpose of this group.  Our goal is to assemble a group of
> > > vendors and operators (not "publish or perish" academics) to discuss and
> > > recommend effective strategies for incremental deployment of security
> > > solutions for BGP (e.g., such as the ongoing RPKI and BGP-SEC work).  It
> > > is not to design new security protocols or to "write policy and
> > > procedures for operators" -- that would of course be over-reaching and
> > > presumptuous.  The goal is specifically to identify strategies for
> > > incremental deployment of the solutions designed and evaluated by the
> > > appropriate technical groups (e.g., IETF working groups).  And, while the
> > > SIGCOMM paper you mention is an example of such a strategy, it is just
> > > one single example -- and is by no means the recommendation of a group
> > > that is not yet even fully assembled yet.  The working group will debate
> > > and discuss a great many issues before suggesting any strategies, and
> > > those strategies would be the output of the entire working group.
> > >
> > > <tongue in cheek> As for "publish or perish" academics, I doubt you'll
> > > find that the small set of academics who choose to go knee deep into
> > > operational issues do so because they are trying to optimize their
> > > academic careers... ;) </tongue in cheek>
> > >
> > > -- Jen