WebApp Sec mailing list archives

Re: Problems with most web app auth schemes


From: Ingo Struck <ingo () ingostruck de>
Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2003 00:51:01 +0200

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Hi Robert,

The various web app schemes aren't trying to establish iron-clad security.
They are trying to reduce the risk of loss to the client (customer) and
server (merchant) to an acceptible level without being so intrusive that
the clients won't attempt the transaction or be turned away.

The reason we can't get better security for current systems is that they
pass the "good enough" tests for most clients. Merchants and credit card
companies have enough data to understand the loss rate. So long as they can
recover that in the prices they charge, there's no reason to change (same
thing applies to ATMs).
- From the insurance broker's point of view (which I can fortunately follow to 
some extent due to some decent knowledge of statistics) you are of course
right - the loss of income you lower with improved "security" should always
outweigh the investment in it...

Alas, such an attitude
- - is unsatisfactory from a theoretical point of view
- - does not help to improve things basically

The "good enough" policy is dangerous, because there are certainly always
some attackers who are willing and able to exploit that on a large scale (just
like all worst case scenarios: they are rather improbable but could be 
devastating if they occur) and it is dangerous because it might lower the 
overall trust in your system (some "victims" that you had in your calculation 
may be disappointed and not contented with the offered compensation).

On the other hand it is not a real option from a "customers" point of view to 
pay the price for only "good enough" systems some supplier uses - in a long 
term calculation a "best possible" strategy will surely pay off better.

Kind regards

Ingo

- -- 
ingo () ingostruck de
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