WebApp Sec mailing list archives
Re: Problems with most web app auth schemes
From: Tim <tim-security () sentinelchicken org>
Date: Sun, 27 Jul 2003 18:17:04 -0700
That is true. *HOWEVER* this misses the point of a PKI, CAs and RAs. TRUST!!!! Exactly what is it in a locally-created, self-signed cert that induced me to have any confidence at all in the validity of the assertion the cert is making? This is why PKIs exist. This is why CPSs exist. This is why CAs and RAs exist. This is why CRLs exist. (Nominally) to provide the recipient of a public key/cert some small measure of reason to believe that the holder of the private key that is the partner of the public key being presented is who they are representing themselves to be. Given the approach you recommend above, I can create a public key with your name in it and become you . . . Matter of fact, I've just created "your" public (PGP) key and will attach it to this message. Problem is, *I* have the private key associated with it . . . :->
Of course. This is obvious. The thing is, the vast majority of web applications do no authentication upon signup. None at all. You set up a yahoo account, do they care if you are really John Q. Doe? No. But once you do have an account, and you start *using* that account, and people begin to implicitly think that the email address you use is actually you, whether you ever state your name or not. That is how humans are. Currently though, systems are pretty easy to attack even after the account is set up. So, the point is, you could sign up for a yahoo account with a private key, associate it with your new yahoo email address, and there we have it. A good authentication system based upon the initial signup. (and only as good as the initial setup) You do bring up a good point, that is, another poster in this discussion stated "Authentication is easy". This is totally bogus. The most difficult part of any of this is identifying who you are talking to upon first contact. This is why your CAs will do so much (probably not enough) checking on your identity when you buy a cert. So yeah, this is a really hard problem. But, this isn't the problem most people want to solve. And there is no reason why people shouldn't have the option to use a public key system for website authentication. It just makes sense. That way, the system will no longer rely on the technical security of your apps, it will merely rely on the amount of verification the administrators decide to employ upon sign-up. They should have the ability to pick a PKI of their own. (Should a decent standard for those exist some day. =) tim
Current thread:
- Problems with most web app auth schemes Kevin Spett (Jul 26)
- Re: Problems with most web app auth schemes Erik Kangas, PhD (Jul 26)
- Re: Problems with most web app auth schemes Brant Langer Gurganus (Jul 27)
- Re: Problems with most web app auth schemes Tim (Jul 27)
- Re: Problems with most web app auth schemes George W. Capehart (Jul 27)
- Re: Problems with most web app auth schemes Tim (Jul 27)
- Re: Problems with most web app auth schemes George W. Capehart (Jul 28)
- Re: Problems with most web app auth schemes Tim (Jul 27)
- Re: Problems with most web app auth schemes Ingo Struck (Jul 27)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- RE: Problems with most web app auth schemes Cowles, Robert D. (Jul 27)
- Re: Problems with most web app auth schemes Ingo Struck (Jul 27)
- Re: Problems with most web app auth schemes webappsec (Jul 28)
- RE: Problems with most web app auth schemes Brass, Phil (ISS Atlanta) (Jul 29)