Re: Proposal to anti-phishing

[Rogan Dawes <discard () dawes za net>]

> > > And then there are other issues, like which smartcard + pki 
> > > + message format must be supported by the PC, OS, and 
> > > user's software.  And do all these factors interoperate 
> > > smoothly with all the other software a banking customer
> > > may have.
> > > Finally, there is the need to re-authenicate ever customer 
> > > in order to issue a new identifier in the form of the card.
> >
> > So long as the smartcard supports PKCS#11, there should be no problem 
> > interacting with it.
> >
> > The PKI software chosen by the bank should be irrelevant, as it still 
> > produces certificates in the standard X.509 formats.
>
>
> The selected CA, cert issuing process, extensions and or cert constrainst
> fields, CA policy statement and the fields/structure in the messages
> generally give all the PKCS 11 and X.509 a strong flavour of 'proprietary'
> implmentations.

PKCS#11 is not subject to proprietary flavours, to the best of my 
knowledge. This means that a customer that has a card reader that 
supports PKCS#11 can interact with standards supporting browsers such as 
IE and Firefox to access the certificates stored on their smart cards.

Sure X.509 has a number of optional fields that may or may not be used 
by a particular implementation of PKI. But please see below for an 
explanation of why this doesn't matter.

> Worse, many CA approachs will provide an assertion about a person (lyal
> collins) not theat person's accounts, or conversely, with accounts.  In the
> former case, I have to register my cert with each account I have with each
> (so the banks can update their account profiles with my cert details) while
> the latter case means a new cert for each account I have.  
>
> If this isn't a case of inplementing new 1:1 security relationships just to
> replaice existing solutions with new technology, without saving costs, I
> don't know what is.

There are a couple of ways of approaching this: Either have different 
smart-cards per bank, and the bank manages their own cards/certs 
entirely, or let the user have a smart card, and the bank only manages a 
private/public key pair on the smart card.

Either way, the bank is still in control of the issuing process. Note 
that I have never suggested that you should have only a single private 
key and certificate, that all banks use to identify you. Absolutely, 
each bank will want to control the certificates that they recognise, and 
allow to access their systems.

The main thing that I think you missed here is that you CAN store 
multiple key pairs on a single smart card. But I think that more likely, 
and more feasible from a management perspective, is that banks will 
issue their own smart card. That way, if you lose a single card, you do 
not lose all your identities at once.

In another email sent to this list, I proposed that banks make use of 
the smart card facilities available on many credit and debit cards 
already in the field, by allowing customers to use those to authenticate 
to their internet banking services. Maybe you should read that email for 
a better understanding of how I am thinking . . .

> > Message format can be specified by the online application, as it does 
> > not have to interact with anyone else, other than that single online 
> > application.
>
> This = proprietary solutuion., What about my other financial/bank
> relationships?

Why should they have to interact with each other via the Internet? They 
already have existing relationships set up via SWIFT, etc . . .

If each bank has their own certificate, they are at complete liberty to 
use them as they choose . . .

> > > Technically, a good idea.  Practically, and commercially, 
> >
> > very hard and
> >
> > > expensive to do.  Requiring every on-line banking customer 
> >
> > to buy a new
> >
> > > computer in order to use on-line banking is probably worse 
> >
> > than giving
> >
> > > customers a new computer, something that does happen for high worth
> > > individuals in a few rare cases.
> >
> > I'm not suggesting for a second that people will HAVE to buy a new 
> > computer. You can buy a smart-card reader for les than USD30. No need 
> > for a new computer, if you already have one.
>
>
> Smartcard readers are like sterilising bullets - the benefit (germ free) is
> far outweighed by other effects (the bullet kills you).

I call bull on this. A number of banks already offer customers the 
option of using smart cards. I fail to see how adding a smart card 
reader to an existing PC has negative side effects?

Old PC's can use serial or parallel readers, more recent PC's can use 
USB readers. Still NEWER machines can use integrated card readers. 
Where's the downside?

> > My point was that IF manufacturers start shipping computers with a 
> > smart-card reader already part of the PC, and with drivers already 
> > installed as part of the OS installation, then we start 
> > approaching the 
> > "zero-setup" that was originally posited as the "Holy Grail".
>
> We can but hope - one day, Oh one day

Indeed. That's what this discussion is about. Trying to get (just a 
little) closer to that day . . .
> Lyal

Rogan
--
Rogan Dawes

*ALL* messages to discard () dawes za net will be dropped, and added
to my blacklist. Please respond to "lists AT dawes DOT za DOT net"