RE: Smart card proposal

["Richard M. Smith" <rms () computerbytesman com>]

Hi Mary Ann,

What kind of Windows driver does a USB key token need?  At least with USB
flash disks, most Windows systems built in the last 5 years have a driver
for USB flash disks.  Also would a Web site talk to the device?  Perhaps
with an ActiveX control?

The big problem with USB devices is the dang USB sockets on many computers
is on their backsides and access is difficult.  I just tested USB flash disk
usability during a recent vacation in Argentina.  I tried out about 20
different computers in Internet cafes, it was a pain to get to all the USB
sockets.  There is some hope.  Newer systems are coming with front-side USB
sockets which should become more common since USB flash disk are replacing
floppy disks.

USB devices are pretty easy to forget also.  Can a USB key token only be
left in a machine for only the 5 to 10 seconds  that it takes to do an
authorization and not for the entire banking session?

If there are no driver issues with a USB key token, maybe it's the best way
to go.

Richard 

-----Original Message-----
From: maburns () safenet-inc com [mailto:maburns () safenet-inc com] 
Sent: Monday, January 24, 2005 7:27 PM
To: hugo.fortier () gmail com; rms () computerbytesman com
Cc: webappsec () securityfocus com
Subject: RE: Smart card proposal


Hugo

The USB Key token would eliminate the need for the smartcard reader and the
pin can be typed on the keyboard since It does not really matter if the
keystrokes are copied since with two-factor authentication you need the
combination of the physical device and the pin# ( two factor is - something
you have (USB key) with something you know (pin#).

The RSA random password generator won't work for the reason below. The RSA
secure ID are more expense  than an USB token like Rainbow iKey and need a
battery replacement (USB token does not). Plus RSA is a random password
generator and is not really two factor authentication and the deployment on
a RSA Radius server is such that all remote users need to be on the system
since the sever cannot allow some to have the RSA token and others in the
directory to have user name and passwords. 

USB tokens can be issued to some users (who want high security) and the
others can remain on user names and password. Thus providing the bank with
the answer they need. Use the USB key for top security and be protected or
continue to use user name and password but at your own risk. 

If the user loses their key they call the help desk and get a temp user name
and password and the bank sends out another key same as if they lost their
ATM card, they get a replacement. Or they can elect to switch over the
username and password if they don't like the key. 

Mary Ann

-----Original Message-----
From: Hugo Fortier [mailto:hugo.fortier () gmail com] 
Sent: Monday, January 24, 2005 10:20 AM
To: Richard M. Smith
Cc: Webappsec List
Subject: Re: Smart card proposal

USB Flash drive and Credit Card sized CD are't to be compaired with
SmardCard. They have none of the propriety that a smartcard have...
While it's is somewhat better than storing the key directly on the computer,
it should't be considered a lot more secure. And it be a lot cheaper tu just
use a crypto key stored on the PC.

SmartCard readers are getting cheaper and cheaper, only issue is that
inexpensive one does not have PIN Pad included in the reader. It's a bad
idea to enter your pin on your computer keyboard.

I agree with you that PIN number generator are interesting, but for a online
bank they does't provide the advantage a smart card would give them (Aka
Digital Signature).

Also those RSA Token have short lifetime, due to the fact that they have
built-in battery and are easy to break. I doubt RSA Token are cost effective
on big deployment like Online banking...

We have to remember that the cost of the solution have to be lower than the
lost caused by fraud.

Hugo

On Mon, 24 Jan 2005 07:27:54 -0500, Richard M. Smith
<rms () computerbytesman com> wrote:
> Since almost no PCs that I am aware of have SmardCard readers, I don't 
> see how this scheme works.  Could a USB flash drive or a credit 
> card-sized CD ROM be used instead? (See
> http://www.mediaheaven.co.uk/cd-business-cards.htm)  These devices 
> typically don't require new software.
>
> I still like a PIN-number generator device for a key ring as the best 
> method to improve security beyond passwords and PINS.  One of these 
> devices generates random PIN numbers that are only known by the bank 
> and the person who is holding the device.  They are popular her in the 
> States in remote access systems to corporate networks.  (See 
> http://www.rsasecurity.com/node.asp?id=1173).
>
> Richard
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Rogan Dawes [mailto:discard () dawes za net]
> Sent: Wednesday, January 19, 2005 5:47 AM
> To: Webappsec List
> Subject: Smart card proposal
>
> Hi folks,
>
> As part of the discussion recently about phishing, I was thinking 
> about how a hardware token (and a smart card in particular) could be 
> used to secure web transactions.
>
> It also struck me that more and more banks are issuing credit or debit 
> cards with smart-card capabilities.
>
> This led to the thought that banks could use the smart-card 
> capabilities (via a smart-card reader) to store a private key and SSL 
> client certificate, which would be used to authenticate their clients 
> when they wish to perform internet banking.
>
> Positive consequences:
>
> The bank is performing the same effective authentication as they do at 
> their ATM's. Something you have (the card) and something you know (the 
> PIN). This may or may not be the same PIN as would be used in an ATM.
> This would be a policy decision, made by the issuing bank.
>
> Policy decisions can be enforced on the smart card, because the smart 
> card can run applications. So policies such as PIN complexity, 
> lockout, etc can all be specified by the bank, and enforced. This is 
> platform independent, browser independent, CPU independent, etc.
>
> Users already have an idea of how to protect their credit cards. They 
> know what the implications are if they get lost or stolen. They tend 
> to keep them in a safe place. Even if they do get compromised, the 
> card is still protected by a PIN, and is effectively unusable.
>
> ATM's mostly already have infrastructure to read and communicate with 
> smart cards. Users can use ATM's as self-service terminals to set up 
> their internet banking. e.g. the user enters their PIN at the ATM, 
> selects Internet Banking, Register. The ATM instructs the smart card 
> to generate a private key, takes a copy of the public key, generates a 
> CSR, requests the Bank's CA to sign the cert, and installs the cert 
> into the smart card. It then asks the user to choose a PIN for the 
> certificate, so that it cannot be accessed without it. At the same 
> time, it links the certificate to the same accounts that the user can 
> access via the ATM, so that Internet banking is effectively seamless.
>
> If the user forgets the certificate PIN, and tries to guess it more 
> than ${policy} times, the smart card locks it out. Then, the user can 
> go to an ATM, enter his ATM PIN, request a certificate PIN reset, the 
> ATM then supplies a (card specific) PIN Unlock Key, which allows the 
> user to enter a new PIN for the cert.
>
> The certificate lifetime would be the same as the validity period of 
> the credit card. When the bank issues a new credit card, the user 
> should go back to an ATM, and reregister for Internet banking. 
> Alternatively, if the user is already registered, the bank can 
> pregenerate a key and certificate in the card, register it with 
> Internet Banking, and provide the user with the certificate PIN in the 
> same way as they do with the ATM PIN.
>
> Depending on the bank's policy, the user may be able to change the PIN 
> at their own computer. This would however mean that the bank would not 
> be in a position to know what the current certificate PIN actually is.
> An alternative is to require the PUK before allowing PIN changes. The 
> PUK could only be provided by the ATM . . . allowing the bank to 
> obtain a copy of the certificate PIN . . .
>
> Negative Implications:
>
> If the credit card is stolen, there is a risk of access via the 
> Internet as well. This may or may not already be an issue, if users 
> can self-register using their credit card PIN. (possible in some 
> countries)
>
> Using the smart card at a merchant might allow the merchant to issue 
> additional internet banking transactions while the card is inserted in 
> the slot, and the PIN has been entered into their card processing 
> device. I think the close coincidence of the fraudulent transactions 
> with a legitimate transaction would be suspicious. Note that it would
> (should) not be possible to delay the transaction until after the card 
> is taken out. (Question: If I connect using a client cert, establish a 
> SSL shared session key, then remove the smart card, can I continue to 
> use that session key?) Also, most merchants do not have access to 
> reprogram their card terminals, this is generally done by the supplier.
>
> Session Riding:
>
> One thing that I have ignored up until now is the issue of session 
> riding, where an attacker makes use of the fact that the SSL 
> connection is transparently created.
>
> One thing mitigating against that is the requirement for the user to 
> have entered their PIN to access the certificate on the card. It may 
> be possible to set a timeout on the card, so that the PIN must be
reentered
>   to continue transacting.
>
> Thoughts? Comments?
>
> Rogan
> --
> Rogan Dawes
>
> *ALL* messages to discard () dawes za net will be dropped, and added to 
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