WebApp Sec mailing list archives
RE: (secure email) Proposal to anti-phishing
From: "Lyal Collins" <lyal.collins () key2it com au>
Date: Tue, 25 Jan 2005 06:30:43 +1100
Here's where this thread get interesting. As a customer I don't want or need secure email with every bank in the world, just the ones I've decided to trust with my money/future. As a bank, I don't want to enable my customers with secure access to competing banks (i.e. the global secure email model) - let my competitors spend on acquiring the customer relationship instead of cannibalising the benefits of my expenditure. If, by enabling bank customers to reduce their phishing/fraud exposure, the bank reduces it's losses, the phishing will move elsewhere to other baks, who can choose to deal with the problem however they like. In a few years/decades, there will re-emerge commercial pressures to allow a level of globalness to secure email. This doesn't mandate a single specification (unlike PGP or S/MIME). It does however, cater to groups of companies to agree to trust each other's authenticaiton of their mutual customers (and internal staff) and thus exchange secure emails to their mutual benefits. A federated model, in Liberty Alliance terms, applied to email. There are already analogies in email. E.g. create an email in Outlook that is sent to an Exchaneg Server, where its converted to SMTP, passes to another mail server where it's converted to, say, Notes, then on-forwarded to a recipient user. Setting up this 'trusted' network is easy. Banks, indeed, companies can do this for their customers, without waiting for anyone else to do so. On-Line banking grew this way, without waiting for a global trusted network (which the internet still isn't). Growing trusted services from the ground up is a lot easier that being hit by fraud and poor custoemr retention until the whole world is ready to spend on an entire new 'trusted' infrastructure. 'Big Bangs' no longer happen - internet is about emerging growth being found acceptable to the marketplace (reward = continued growth + experience + profit) or not (reward = experience) Just some views Lyal
-----Original Message----- From: Michael Silk [mailto:michaelsilk () gmail com] Sent: Monday, 24 January 2005 8:56 PM To: Lyal Collins Cc: webappsec () securityfocus com Subject: Re: (secure email) Proposal to anti-phishing You are talking about a secure email _network_, where only "trusted" people can send emails to members. (i.e: a private mailing list). You are suggesting a trusted system like this, right? And your argument is that non-trusteds (phishers) can't get in and send emails - fine, it may be true (depending on membership verification process). How does this list communicate with the outside world? Customers? Banks? ...? Do they have to become "trusted" too ? On what basis ? Email address? Certificate? Who manages all this trust? Whats the change-over timeframe to get the world onto this system as opposed to the current one ? I'm still a little confused as to what you are suggesting the solution (the pratical solution) is here... because setting up such a trusted network just isn't possible (and has been tried before, hasn't it ?) If your idea is just about having a way to trust specific peoples' messages (certificates) then fine, it's a system that would work on a positive basis (customer: "Yes, this is from my bank, because the little padlock is there..!") but not on a negative basis (customer: "Hmm, it says its from my bank, but there is no pad lock... I will click it anyway ... those banks, always stuffing things up."). Implemented with my idea[1] from a long time ago, however, it could be neat :) But I still don't see your problem with Client-side certificates. -- Michael [1] http://michaelsilk.blogspot.com/2004/11/article-solution-to-ph ishing.html On Mon, 24 Jan 2005 18:54:46 +1100, Lyal Collins <lyal.collins () key2it com au> wrote:The attraction of secure emails are that 'phishers' have tocompromise everyrecipient's mailbox/secure email solution in the world,THEN launch aphishing attack against customers of select bank in orderto get the rate ofreturn they do today. This seems a much harder, and less profitable sequence aphisher must gothrough, which has a higher probability of detection andconvictability,increasing deterrence and decreasing the phishers payback. Lyal-----Original Message----- From: Michael Silk [mailto:michaelsilk () gmail com] Sent: Monday, 24 January 2005 6:42 PM To: Lyal Collins Cc: webappsec () securityfocus com Subject: Re: (secure email) Proposal to anti-phishing Thats not really "Phishing" though, is it? (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing) It is on one handin that theyare lured to the site, but they don't provide anyinformation, it isstolen from them by the malware. Sure, it's a problem that must be dealt with but to saythat clientside certificates are useless due to that is silly because that (compromised system) is a problem _no matter what_ solution is implemented ("secure" emails). -- Michael Lyal said:-----Original Message----- From: Michael Silk [mailto:michaelsilk () gmail com] Sent: Monday, 24 January 2005 3:24 PM To: lyal.collins () key2it com au; webappsec () securityfocus com Subject: RE: (secure email) Proposal to anti-phishing Lyal said:The difference is that client-side SSL exists today in anindustrystandard platform independent manner that couldbe effectivelydeployed. (management is a different issue that Iwill be acoward andignore for now.)It's hard to see how changing the locaiton of a password verification actually makes any difference to accountholder security or phishing.Is it? Surely it's easy to see. Phishing requries theuser to enterthe password in a website. If they don't need to dothis (or onlyenter partial password) because of certificate, thenI think it'spretty easy to see how that is an advantage.Seen the newer generaitons of phishing, where going to thefaked bank siteloads up the user's PC with spyware, keyloggers et al? Certificates are compromised as soon as any malware entersthe machine -which is useless in this phishing scenario.And then there's the pragmatic fact that people will payMicrosoftprotection-racket funds for Microsoftanti-spyware to protectthemselves transparently in the background from thecrappy softwareMicrosoft *SOLD* them in the first place...andthey will dothis longbefore they'll use any of the "secure email" solutions today that require user interaction & thought. But I'm all for an global standard secure emailsolution ifyou happento have one of those handy,Actually, my company does - if anyone wants to buy it.Global, is it? Who buys it then? How does it work? Careto share moredetails, because there is not much information on yoursite. Doesn'tseem any different to what PGP would provide. It's also rather interesting that you claim it "encrypts"everything,but also analyses it for spam, viruses ... now justhow does it dothat :) ? And what is "content checked". Seems far to "big brother" for my liking.
Current thread:
- RE: (secure email) Proposal to anti-phishing Evans, Arian (Jan 19)
- RE: (secure email) Proposal to anti-phishing Lyal Collins (Jan 23)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- RE: (secure email) Proposal to anti-phishing Michael Silk (Jan 24)
- RE: (secure email) Proposal to anti-phishing Lyal Collins (Jan 24)
- Re: (secure email) Proposal to anti-phishing Michael Silk (Jan 24)
- RE: (secure email) Proposal to anti-phishing Lyal Collins (Jan 24)
- Re: (secure email) Proposal to anti-phishing Michael Silk (Jan 24)
- RE: (secure email) Proposal to anti-phishing Lyal Collins (Jan 24)
- RE: (secure email) Proposal to anti-phishing Lyal Collins (Jan 24)
- RE: (secure email) Proposal to anti-phishing Lyal Collins (Jan 24)
- Re: (secure email) Proposal to anti-phishing Michael Silk (Jan 24)
- RE: (secure email) Proposal to anti-phishing Lyal Collins (Jan 27)
- Re: (secure email) Proposal to anti-phishing Michael Silk (Jan 27)