Re: [privacy] U.S. Government to Ask Courts to Toss Phone

["Lindsey, Ben J" <ben.lindsey () centerpointenergy com>]

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> -----Original Message-----
> From: coderman [mailto:coderman () gmail com] 
>
> On 6/12/06, Lindsey, Ben J <ben.lindsey () centerpointenergy com> wrote:
> > ...
> >   I personally wouldn't compare the two "wars" -- but 
> > that's just me.  I see them being very different.  I do agree 
> > there will be no defining moment of victory.  I certainly 
> > hope that one day it will certainly be a smaller problem (or 
> > perhaps a less worrisome one) so that we might get on with 
> > things as usual.
>
> agreed; i suppose i meant they are similar in that it is impossible to
> "win" either, in the sense that a final battle will not ensure no more
> drugs, or no more terrorism.
>
> this is different from traditional wars where one side does clearly
> and finally prevail over the other.  this is the difference and
> similarity i meant to highlight.

I understand your point very much -- it is very valid, because this is clearly not a war with two sides fighting for a 
generally static outcome.  In that sort of manner, "war on foo" is a good comparison to help in the understanding of 
the goals involved. (which are, as you've implied (I think), somewhat vague to many perhaps) 

> >   I'm not comfortable with this by any means, but I 
> > tolerate it, to a certain degree I accept it as part of the 
> > situation.  I don't think any "state of war" by anyone's 
> > definition in the US or abroad was meant to be comfy for 
> > those involved -- and I think (personally) that people in the 
> > US (as they are possible targets) are in fact involved.  I 
> > don't live in fear of terrorism -- simply in the knowledge 
> > that I am not untouchable.
>
> i worded this poorly; i suppose i wanted to focus on the fact that
> this war is not a foreign war like most people are used to.  the
> battle is going to wage across national boundaries and there are a lot
> of subsequent consequences of this fact that i think are overlooked by
> the population in general.

  Indeed, there can be from one to many true battlegrounds or none at all for it to persist.
 
> >   By law written previous to the war, or by more recent 
> > legislation?  And when you think about this, remember that 
> > the President is not only head of the executive branch, but 
> > the commander-in-chief of armed forces -- as such, if he 
> > requires something to carry out that duty, I have no problem 
> > considering it -- but others seem to throw up a wall without 
> > consideration.  I honestly can't tell anymore whether that is 
> > simply because of who he is or the thing he asks for -- it 
> > has become blurry in that respect.  I would certainly say the 
> > wording the Authorization of Military Force is (at best) nebulous.
>
> right, and this is where most of my concerns lay.  is it ever
> appropriate to bypass FISA?  what level of oversight is appropriate?
> can it be internal to a specific agency only?  does it require
> external judicial review by a quorum of judges?  can a single
> individual in the justice department negate precedent? etc.

  Regarding FISA, I honestly don't have a personal feeling about whether its OK to go around them and when -- I will 
say that (perhaps) it might make more sense to revisit FISA and properly address this.  On the other hand, given the 
political context of everything now I don't think I want this in a judge's hands, much less a politician.

> this poor and unspecific wording and assumed context is a huge part of
> the problem.  i don't know that i have a good answer to it; every one
> of our elected representatives has failed to some degree; this is not
> a partisan problem (democrats were involved in some of the classified
> presentations to the senate, etc, and either out of fear or negligence
> did not air any concerns at the time, etc)
>
> but it has certainly turned political (one of the disgusting actions i
> clearly remember was a democrat on a review keeping his silence during
> an overview of the terrorist surveillance program, and then
> publicizing a copy of a letter of concern he wrote when the NYT
> published about the program.  this was clearly a political gambit for
> personal gain with no real effort or concern about the liberties
> involved)
>
> anyway, this is a longer discussion.  i could get sidetracked in the
> political treachery of either side for hours... :/

  I'm curious to know myself just how much is pure political treachery vs. how much is a deeply felt conviction.  I'm 
sorry to say I just can't tell anymore.

> >   I find the Narus deal a bit fishy for the same reasons I 
> > wouldn't want citizens to have their phone calls listened to 
> > without sufficient cause.  As juicy as all that data may 
> > seem, with no oversight, it's a nightmare.  Mostly I see the 
> > Narus deal as a waste -- for instance: why watch all the 
> > channels all the time of the only one with shows you like 
> > also give you the ability to concentrate!  There is simply to 
> > much data there to comprehend, via human or machine.
>
> right, and this is why i think the TIA programs are a waste; the odds
> are just too small for this kind of analysis to be effective.  they
> are a huge boon when applied properly (for example, marketing
> demographics or credit card fraud detection) but trying to locate
> potential terrorists is a very poor problem to try and adapt these
> methods to.

  I don't know how I feel about it yet, but I'd rather give it some time than cut it off at the knees.  I say that 
about certain aspects of TIA, but certainly not in the context of internet snooping, because I feel that is most 
certainly like pissing up a rope.

> >   I can only think of things I was aware of because of my 
> > position -- but certainly you can think of situations in US 
> > history where certain rights were suspended or flat-out run 
> > over in order to address an issue of "national security."
>
> fair enough.  and in that respect these current efforts are not nearly
> as invasive or damaging.

  I agree, the real question is who should do the dirty work required to make sure they don't become as invasive.  I'm 
pretty sure that is something I do not trust the ACLU with.  I really wish there was a better option.

> >   I'm not so sure it wouldn't have been approved under FISA 
> > -- but I do know the time it would have taken could have made 
> > a large blind spot during the wait, or even worse, spilled 
> > the beans.  Given the wording of the Authorization of 
> > Military Force by the house and senate, the administration 
> > may have even felt there was no need.  I would also imagine 
> > that they needed this to remain under the radar as long as 
> > possible in order for it to be effective.  It is difficult to 
> > say if that was the reasoning, and as you say, this remains 
> > an issue.  I can only think of possible reasons it was done 
> > as it was, I'm not what you might call a proponent of 
> > breaking the rules.
>
> true.  i don't know enough to pass judgement, but there are a number
> of details here that leave a bad taste; the reluctance of Ashcroft to
> continue authorization, the intentional bypass of FISA (and like you
> said, it might have been approved, and perhaps only some process
> changes were necessary to support this type of monitoring), etc.

  I imagine Ashcroft was conflicted, it is a difficult decision -- especially given the FISA situation and how it 
relates to some people natural ability to think of possible repercussions more easily than possible results.  Now that 
its all out in the open, perhaps running it through FISA (even after the fact) could be an option.

> >   I already told you what I used to do for a living -- deep 
> > black often serves a vital purpose, even though on the face 
> > of it I agree, it does look deceitful.  I remember a certain 
> > military intelligence project for instance that had 
> > information about 911 terrorists before the fact.  Whether 
> > the information they gleaned would have been effective had it 
> > become known to the proper domestic authorities is not 
> > something I can begin to speculate about.  I can't say how 
> > "black" a project that was, except to say it is likely that 
> > congress/senate would not like it.
>
> i would have to agree with you on the value of this method, but i
> still insist that it is necessary and possible to implement
> appropriate oversight.  i guess this is what irked me about it - it
> was assumed to be canceled, and not even a subset of the
> congress/senate cleared for national security matters knew what had
> really happened. (or maybe some subset did, and simply said nothing,
> which gets back to the general distasteful manner in which politics
> interferes with actual public interest which i talked about earlier)

Oversight?  Or just accountability?  I'd prefer the latter, given that oversight doesn't guarantee accountability, it 
almost does the opposite.

> >   Oversight is great, so long as it does not compromise the 
> > mission, otherwise why even try?  If oversight could be 
> > safely achieved, I would certainly jump on the oversight 
> > bandwagon.  Trouble is, we don't have people capable of 
> > proper oversight at this point.
>
> i always thought that members of the judiciary with proper security
> clearances was a suitable source of objective and reasonable
> oversight.

  How many security clearances should be handed out just for this, and who will decide to whom -- will you give these 
judges all the information being considered by operatives, or just a general idea?  While its a good idea in theory, I 
don't know if it would be practical.

> what scares me is when an operative, a high ranking
> officer/administrator and maybe two  other people in the DoJ /
> executive branch are aware of the mere existence of a program, let
> alone its ongoing status/actions.

  I don't blame you, it’s a scary thing sometimes.
 
> > Sure, we have lots of politicians (of all kinds) who like 
> > to say the word, but I'm not sure they understand the 
> > possible consequences of doing it wrong.  I'm sure we will 
> > get there eventually though, I imagine everyone would like to 
> > know that there were competent watchers watching the watchers.
>
> fair enough; it's easy for me to take shots from the sidelines but
> there are very real lives at stake and i can sympathize with the
> desire to err on the side of caution (too much secrecy).

  Well, I suppose that does pretty well state the angle I take on all of this -- Cautious.
 
> >   ECHELON rises again, huh?  Very interesting, I agree.
>
> indeed.  the fiber bay in the USS Jimmy Carter and the infrastructure
> expansion at various landing points near by (oregon) continue to pique
> my curiosity into what this program has evolved into :P

  I can't wait to see what they waste my money on next!
 
> > Yes, it involves citizens, but also foreign nationals -- 
> > but no one (to my knowledge) has ever said, "Stop taking our 
> > information and privacy and only take theirs.."
>
> i guess this was an assumption on my part.  who doesn't expect their
> government to spy abroad?  i suppose if we had no enemies i'd argue
> against the spy craft in general but this is a pipe dream even i can't
> anticipate in the best of worlds...

  I still hope there will be much simpler times in our country's future, I don't want it to always be a pipe dream.  I 
don't know if it is a problem we can't solve, or just human nature we can't control.

> >   Accountability is something that is measured in stages, 
> > to say there is no accountability in this situation would (to 
> > me) be a supposition at this point, there will be 
> > accountability, but how many fingers can be in the 
> > informational pie before it is unacceptable.
>
> true, there is accountability in some form, and i should have said it
> is currently insufficient and that i disagree with the extent to which
> it has been either intentionally or unintentionally limited.

  I'd say accountability certainly has been (for whatever reason) limited, whether intentionaly or out of ignorance -- 
and that needs to change.

> >   I will certainly say that TIA is not a mature program -- 
> > but to say it does cannot have a more useful future seems to 
> > contradict the entire method.  (which is to say, the more 
> > data you get and the better you become at interpreting it -- 
> > the more true positives you will receive)  If indeed it 
> > cannot be perfected however, I agree, chuck it -- for now, 
> > I'll give it time.
>
> fair enough; perhaps if thresholds are set high enough and the right
> data is applied it will be useful. i will continue to remain very
> skeptical of this though, simply because i'm familiar with the
> technical difficulties of this type of profiling when applied to very
> small subsets (terrorists) whose potentially identifying traits also
> invoke a large number of false positives.

  Lets just hope it doesn't get too much worse before it tries to turn a corner.
 
> >   When citizen A places a call to suspected terrorist B at 
> > the Tora Bora hideout, it would certainly be nice to know 
> > that there were capable people keeping an eye on Mr. A and 
> > his friends.  To be honest and simplistic, I think this is 
> > the singular goal of the entire domestic program.
>
> agreed, and this is reasonable (for some definition of "keeping an eye
> on").  and while some people like to denounce intelligence service all
> around, i accept that this is one of many situations where it is
> reasonable and useful to have them looking out for the public
> interest. this is also why i'd argue it is critical to keep them
> clearly within the bounds of law and devoid of abuses so that they can
> continue to be effective without trampling on individual rights.

  I have to believe that our intelligence community (for the most part, there are bad apples to be sure) does indeed 
have our protection in mind, even when they go overboard.  ;)

> >   Thanks a ton for your mail, I appreciate it a great deal. 
> > It is quite nice to have a decent conversation about this 
> > for a change.
>
> thanks to you as well, it is often hard to have a balanced discussion
> about heated topics.

Always my pleasure,

- -bjl
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